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I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this article is twofold. First, I want 
both to show that state constitutions have been an important 
source of fundamental law and a basis for judicial review 
and to argue that the bar and bench of every state should 
take seriously the potential of its state constitution. 
Second, I want to define what I call, "constitutional 
jurisprudence," to indicate briefly how it affects legal 
argument and judicial decision-making concerning the federal 
Constitution, and to urge lawyers and state courts to 
articulate a constitutional jurisprudence for their own 
state constitution, based on legal, historical, and cultural 
characteristics of their state.
This article, then, will begin with a definition of 
constitutional jurisprudence, together with some 
introductory remarks about its importance. This introduction 
will be followed by an historical survey of the role of 
state constitutions as a basis for judicial review, from the 
colonial period to the present, to demonstrate the precedent 
for and potential use of state constitutions. It will be 
argued that the current state court judicial review 
demonstrates a need for a constitutional jurisprudence to 
guide the construction of a state constitution. Once this 
historicial foundation has been laid, it will be appropriate 
to consider the concerns addressed by theories of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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constitutional jurisprudence concerning the federal 
Constitution and to examine some examples of such theories. 
Finally, these jurisprudential concerns will be considered 
in light of some distinct differences between state consti­
tutions and governments and the federal Constitution and 
government. From this analysis, it will be concluded that in 
many important respects, theories of federal constitutional 
jurisprudence are not appropriate to state constitutions.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE AND ITS LEGAL ROLE 
From its latin derivation, the term, jurisprudence, 
means wisdom about law. This wisdom, however, is not simply 
knowledge of the laws; rather it is an attempt to understand 
how the laws fit together and what sort of overarching 
principles provide the glue to keep them together.^
Constitutional jurisprudence is a species of juris­
prudence. It is concerned with a certain kind of law, 
fundamental law. A constitution is fundamental in that it 
founds the institutions that will be responsible for 
enacting all other laws and purports to demarcate the re­
spective powers of and restrictions upon these institutions. 
Because the United States Constitution does not ex­
plicitly address what legal effect it should have, answering 
this question has been the primary task of constitutional 
jurisprudence in this country. This question has been asked 
as two theoretically distinct but practically interrelated
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2questions. First, if the constitution has some legal 
effect, what is the courts' role in enforcing it? In other 
words, what is the scope of the courts' power of judicial 
review? Second, since the constitution itself does not ar­
ticulate a principle to guide interpretation of it, how are 
the courts to interpret it?
Different persons who have reflected on these questions 
have given a variety of answers. Their readings of the 
Constitution, of course, often reflect concerns that have 
arisen within a broader context of historical analysis and 
political philosophy.
But how is constitutional jurisprudence pertinent to 
legal argument or judicial decision-making? During an
3address he made at a jurisprudence conference last spring. 
Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, James 
Browning, though not intending to belittle jurisprudence, 
candidly stated that he did not consult jurisprudential 
theories when he voted on outcomes of cases before his 
court. Given traditional legal education, his comment is 
quite understandable. At first glance, the processes of 
legal argument and decision-making do not seem to require an 
understanding of how various laws, including constitutional
4provisions, fit together. Since Marbury Madison, the 
permissibility of judicial review has been firmly esta­
blished, and lawyers and judges have been taught to look 
only to the words of the provision at issue and the con­
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
struction that courts in prior cases have given to it.
Neve theless, in the same way that scientific data is 
meaningless without a theory,^ the words of a text do not 
interpret themselves. As theologians, literary critics, and 
historians have discovered, some interpretational theory is 
required to interpret texts.^ An argument for constitutional 
jurisprudence also relies on this premise; since laws are 
texts, a principle or theory of interpretation, ' outside of 
the texts but inspired by or related to the texts, is 
required to interpret them.
As legal realists have recognized, all judges, whether 
consciously or unconsciously, bring to their judicial review 
and their interpretation of constitutional provisions
7extraneous principles, experiences, and emotions. The argu­
ment for a constitutional jurisprudence is that these 
factors should be made explicit and consistent. If constitu­
tional jurisprudence is thus defined, it is clear that state 
court judges, even more than federal judges, need 
constitutional jurisprudence; they need a theory not only 
for the federal Constitution but also one for their own 
state constitution.
That different jurisprudential theories have led to
different interpretations of the same provision strengthens,
rather than weakens, an argument for constitutional juris- 
8prudence. For if we assume a subjective interpretation of 
constitutional provisions by judges, surely a consistency
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5
among a judge's subjective interpretations founded on a 
jurisprudential theory would be of greater service to 
society than inconsistent interpretations. First, this would 
be true because persons could at least formulate certain 
expectations on the basis of which they could lead their
glives with some confidence. Secondly, connecting a legal 
argument or decision to an explicit, jurisprudential theory 
would provide a better foundation for debate about the 
assumptions judges make but do not state in their opinions. 
Thus, if judges have articulated jurisprudential theories, 
ad hoc decisions, based on judges' idiosyncracies, would be 
exposed as just that.
III. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Over the past century, federal courts, armed with the 
fourteenth amendment, have extensively reviewed state laws 
and acts. Because of this federal court activity and the 
academic and political reactions to it, people— including 
lawyers and judges— have had the impression that state 
courts seldom engaged in judicial review based on provisions 
of their own state constitution.^^ Not until very recently, 
on account of a retrenchment by the Burger Court in some 
areas of constitutional law, have many lawyers, judges, and 
commentators begun to take a close look at their state 
constitutions.^^ From the 1780s to the present, however,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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state courts have quietly engaged in judicial review in many
areas of state constitutional law,
A brief overview of state judicial review is important
for two reasons. First, it emphasizes that state courts have
not been as dormant as the lack of discussion about them
would suggest. Second, although Marbury 3Lu Madison and
12subsequent United States Supreme Court cases established
the right of the Supreme Court to review acts of both the
coordinate branches of the federal government and the state
governments, a state constitutional jurisprudence ought to
begin with an examination of state court precedent for
judicial review.
It is often overlooked that state constitutions had
existed a decade before the federal Constitution was
adopted. Eleven of the thirteen original colonies adopted
constitutions for themselves within the eighteen month span
from January of 1776 to June of 1777, when the Articles of
13Confederation were adopted. The other two colonies
14operated under their colonial charters.
But constitutionalism did not spring forth fully 
developed from the minds of the colonials in 1776. The 
drafters of the first state constitutions were deeply 
influenced by political theorists, notably John Locke and 
Baron Montesquieu, who had recommended constitutional 
governments.^^ They were also influenced by their colonial 
experience under English rule, particularily the extensive
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
power of Parliament and the arbitrary actions of colonial
governors appointed by the King,^®
Although after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 great
concessions of power had been exacted from the King by
Parliament, concessions that made up in part what was called
England's unwritten constitution, the powers of Parliament
itself remained unlimited; there was no written constitution
17that restricted it. The contrast between the unlimited
powers of Parliament and the limitations imposed upon their
colonial legislative bodies by written charters left its
mark on the first state constitutions. The drafters of those
constitutions intended as much to limit government as to
18establish it. They limited state government through both 
its design and specific provisions protecting individual 
rights.
In turn, it was the outcry made at the state ratifying
conventions for the addition of a bill of rights to the
federal Constitution that prompted the first Congress to do 
20so. Thus, it was to the state constitutional experience
that James Madison turned for ideas in drafting a federal
bill of rights.
Likewise, the idea of judicial review did not begin
with Marbury. Even during colonial rule, Americans invoked
21Lord Coke's assertion in 1610 in Dr. Bonham's Case that 
"when an Act of Parliament is against common right and 
reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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common law will control it, and adjudge such Act to be
void," These colonial assertions were later echoed by state
courts as principles of state constitutional law in at least
22eight cases between 1780 and 1787, It was because of this 
preexisting context for judicial review in state courts, 
that assumptions about the propriety of federal judicial 
review could be made in the Federalist Papers and by 
Justice Marshall in Marburv.^^
State courts continued to exercise judicial review and 
construe their state constitutions in the nineteenth cen­
tury, Because the Supreme Court decided early on, in Barron
25V. Mayor of Baltimore, that the federal bill of rights was 
not applicable to the laws or actions of state governments, 
the enforcement of individual liberties was left to the 
state courts. Thus, it was the state courts that were con­
fronted with a great number of constitutional challenges 
concerning individual rights.
State courts, like the United States Supreme Court, 
took an interest in protecting individual property rights. 
The doctrine of economic substantive due process, which for 
a time in this century the United States Supreme Court 
pursued, had state constitutional decisions dating from 1855
for prototypes, whereas the federal courts abandoned the
27doctrine of economic substantive due process in the 1930s,
2 8some state courts continued to apply it.
State constitutional decisions have not been restricted
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to property rights. For example, significant decisions were
29made concerning the free exercise of religion; a fact made
poignant by the identification of many of the original
colonies with particular sects. Such cases included permit-
30ting an atheist to be a juror, eliminating religious tests
31for competency of witnesses and competency to vote, and
granting conscientious objector status to avoid required
32service in the state militia. Freedom of speech and the
33press were also litigated.
Long before federal courts were construing the broad
due process provisions of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments, state courts were exercising judicial review of
state government acts based on broad "inalienable rights"
34clauses in state constitutions. For example, in one very
interesting but unique 1848 case, the Tennessee court struck
down, as violative of "the liberty of a free person" by
restraining him from "the exercise of his lawful pursuits,"
an ordinance authorizing the arrest and fining of free
35blacks if they were out after ten o ’clock at night.
Early in this century, many states even enforced state 
constitutional provisions concerning rights of the accused. 
For example, in the 1920s, long before the United Supreme 
Court made the fourth amendment applicable to the states 
through the fourteenth amendment, the Montana Supreme Court 
adopted its own exclusionary rule to enforce the Montana
o f rConstitution's search and seizure provision.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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It is true that in this century state constitutions in 
many substantive areas were eclipsed by the federal Consti­
tution, From the 1930s to the early 1970s the United States 
Supreme Court, through the fourteenth amendment, construed 
federal constitutional rights to afford greater protection
than many states had provided through their own constitu- 
37tions. The Court first acted in the areas of freedom of 
religion and speech, but then in the 1960s, it revolu­
tionized criminal procedure through its construction of the 
due process clause.
Since the early 1970s, however, some retrenchment has
38occurred in Supreme Court decisions in all these areas.
This retrenchment coincided with a desire in many states to
articulate in their state constitutions some of the
39principles that had been invoked by the Warren Court. Both
of these series of events rejuvenated the use of state
constitutions to protect fundamental rights. This revival of
the significance of the state constitution has grown
dramatically in the last few years. Not only have state
constitutions become authority for state decisions, but a
body of articles and commentaries on these decisions is
40beginning to develop.
This revival has encountered some obstacles. Many 
lawyers and judges, being used to relying on federal cases 
to argue constitutional law, have blurred federal and state 
constitutions. As a result of this blurring, the Burger
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Court has considerably increased its discretionary review, 
and ultimate reversal, of cases that have been appealed by 
state executive or legislative branches from state courts 
which, on both state and federal constitutional grounds, 
afforded greater constitutional protection to individuals.^^ 
Although aknowledging that state courts may construe their 
constitutions more protectively than the Supreme Court con­
strues the federal Constitution, the Court has insisted that
such state court decisions must clearly be based on indepen-
42dent and adequate state grounds.
This requirement means that although state courts may 
still construe both federaT and state constitutions or even 
use federal opinions to aid in construing their own consti­
tution, their decisions must evidence a clear demarcation
between the respective analyses of the two constitutional 
43provisions. It also means that any federal case law used
as authority for a particular construction of the state
constitutional provision must be considered persuasive, not
44mandatory, authority.
Since federal authority is merely persuasive in con­
struing state constitutions, state courts ought to examine 
it critically. To facilitate this evaluation of federal case 
law, state courts must first evaluate the jurisprudential 
concerns implicit in that case law. By doing this and then 
reflecting on the particular configuration of these concerns 
in its own state government and constitution, state courts
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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will have a basis for determining the appropriateness of a 
federal decision to the construction of their state consti­
tution. They will also be well on their way toward 
developing a state jurisprudence,
IV. A SURVEY OF FEDERAL JURISPRUDENCE
As already stated, the two crucial questions of consti­
tutional jurisprudence are: first, what is the scope of the
courts' power of judicial review and second, how are the 
courts to interpret it? Not all theories of constitutional 
jurisprudence explicitly distinguish these two questions or 
treat them with equal significance. Some theories address 
one of the questions through the particular answer they give 
to the other. Nevertheless, because in principle the two 
questions are distinguishable and because some commentators 
have done so, they will be treated separately in this sec­
tion. However, when a particular theory of interpretation 
strongly implies a corresponding theory of the scope of 
judicial review, it will be noted. In order not to be redun­
dant, the impact of particular interpretational theories on 
the scope of judicial review will be discussed in the treat­
ment of interpretational theories.
Before discussing these two questions, it might be 
helpful to have a framework into which to place the parti­
cular theories discussed. Thus, it is appropriate at this 
time to mention some of the significant concerns that these
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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theories address. There are at least four such concerns.
The first concern is about how we ought to balance 
democratic government and individual rights. Different 
theories, of course, weight the competing interests dif­
ferently, some emphasizing democracy and others, individual 
rights.
A second concern is about what is the proper domain for 
the exercise of the sovereignty of the states and the 
federal government. This is often characterized as a concern 
for federalism. It not only arises in determining whether 
federal laws are constitutional and whether they thus 
preempt state laws, but federalism is also a factor that the 
Court must consider when it is asked to impose a constitu­
tional standard upon all fifty states through the fourteenth 
amendment.
A third issue that concerns theories of constitutional 
jurisprudence is how to balance the roles of the other two 
coordinate branches of government with the role of the 
judiciary. This concern is inherent in both the concept and 
practice of judicial review, since judicial review requires 
the court to nullify the act of one of the other two 
branches.
The fourth concern pertains to the role of the judi­
ciary itself. It addresses the judiciary's strengths and 
weaknesses. Whether a particular type of judicial review or 
judicial interpretation is appropriate often hinges on a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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theory's assessment of the structure of the judiciary 
itself,
What sbg.uld la Iha Sgope QZ Judicial Review?
Pew, if any commentators, would seriously suggest that 
it is unconstitutional for the Court to review the acts of 
the states and the other federal branches of government. 
Although the Constitution does not explicitly provide for 
it, it had precedent in the common law and in the state 
courts. Likewise, as the Federalist Paper No. 78 and Justice 
Marshall in Marbury concluded, judicial review legitimately 
seems to follow from the assumptions that the court is to 
interpret the law in the cases that come before it and that 
a written constitution, though fundamental law, is still a 
law.
Disregarding the effect of interpretational theories on 
the scope of judicial review, the question boils down to 
whether courts should be prone to engage in judicial review 
or whether they should be reluctant to do so out of 
deference to the sovereignty of the states and the deter­
minations of coordinate branches of the federal government. 
The jurisprudential positions corresponding to these alter­
natives have been characterized as judicial activism and 
judicial r e s t r a i n t , I t  is important in using these desig­
nations, however, that a particular court's activism or 
restraint in particular areas be distinguished from a juris­
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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prudential theory of activism or restraint, which advocates 
activism or restraint as a matter of principle or analysis 
of the structure and function of the court.
An example of a theory that encourages judicial acti­
vism is that of Thomas Grey. Grey has argued that courts 
should enforce what he calls the "unwritten constitution. 
Essentially, this would give the courts broad authority, on 
the basis of extra-constitutional principles discoverable by
the court, to strike down laws promulgated by the states or
48other branches of government. Like most theories advo­
cating activism, Grey's theory is premised on a distrust for 
democratic processes and a concomitant allegiance to the 
protection of individual rights. It also demonstrates a 
faith in the unique capacity of the courts to discover these 
unwritten principles and to apply them to legislative or 
executive action.
At the other end of the spectrum, Alexander Bickel has
argued for greater restraint by the Court on the basis of
49his structural analysis of the judiciary. First, he notes, 
the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III, 
embodies a recognition about the domain of the governmental 
power of the judiciary that is deeply rooted in Anglo- 
American common law. Courts may interpret the Constitution 
only to decide cases or controversies. They are not struc­
turally equipped to be constitutional or statutory rule- 
makers.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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In addition to this structural need for courts to
interpret the law in the context of a controversy, Bickel
invokes the Court's weakness vis-à-vis the executive and
legislative branches to argue for restraint. He echoes the
remark in the Federalist Papers that whereas the legislative
branch controls the purse and the executive, the sword, the
judiciary has few, if any, resources, except the principled
nature and moral authority of its opinions. For this reason,
the Court ought to use aggressively both justiciability
doctrines— advisory opinion, mootness, ripeness, political
question, and standing— that permit it to decline deciding a
case and less controversial decisional principles, like
vagueness and delegation of powers, in order to conserve its 
50power.
Jesse Choper has combined the insights of activists,
like Grey, and of conservatives like Bickel to fashion a
compromise position. He argues that courts are especially
equipped to defend individual rights and that they should
zealously do so,^^ On the other hand, he maintains that
courts should not police the relationships between states
and the federal government or between the branches of the
federal government. These entities themselves, he concludes
from a study of such conflicts, are better equipped than the
52federal courts to resolve their own conflicts.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The second question that a constitutional jurisprudence 
must address is what principle or principles should guide 
the Court in interpreting the Constitution, As will be seen, 
the answer to this second question significantly affects the 
scope of judicial review. The question of interpretation, as 
noted above, arises both from the lack of an explicit inter­
pretational principle in the text of the Constitution itself 
and the necessity to use an extraneous interpretational 
principle in interpreting any text.
The variety of interpretational principles that, like 
those specifically addressing the scope of judicial review, 
have been advocated in theories of constitutional jurispru­
dence reveal different conclusions about the concerns listed 
above. These theories of constitutional interpretation have
been characterized as being noninterpretivist, interpreti-
53vist, or a combination of these two. As one would expect, 
very few persons hold either view in the extreme. One 
example from each extreme should suffice to demonstrate how 
each has dealt with the concerns.
Grey's theory about the "unwritten constitution," pro­
vides an example of extreme noninterpretivism. It is nonin­
terpretivist in that even the text of the Constitution, not 
to mention any intention of the framers, restricts by 
analogy, at best, the kinds of values and the weight that 
the courts may give those values vis-a-vis other govern-
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mental interests. In other words, the Constitution serves
merely to inspire and to authorize the courts to protect
individual rights through such broad provisions as the due
54process and equal protection clauses. It is up to the
courts to discover what "liberty" or "property" or minority
is to be protected and what measures must be taken to
protect them. Thus, individual rights are valued more than
the democratic process or federalism concerns; and great
faith and responsibility is placed upon the courts' ability
to protect them.
At the opposite end of the spectrum lies the radical
interpretivist theory of Raoul Berger. To use Ronald
55Dworkin's helpful distinction, Berger's interpretivist 
theory would require the courts to unearth and enforce the 
particular "conception" of the framers of the Constitution 
rather than to interpret the "concept" embodied in the 
constitutional text and to apply it to a modern society. 
Consequently, Berger's best known work is an attempt to 
perform an historical exegesis of the fourteenth
c ̂amendment. Based on this exegesis, he severely criticizes 
how the Court, in his opinion, has interpreted the due 
process and equal protection clauses more broadly than the 
framers intended.
Berger's constitutional jurisprudence demonstrates an 
unwaivering trust in and commitment to the democratic 
process and a corresponding doubt about the capabilities of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the judiciary to articulate the will of the people. His
response to the tendency of activists to call upon the 
courts to solve social problems, even those involving indi­
vidual rights, is that framers intended the amendment
process to be the only remedy for new problems of a consti-
57tutional magnitude. Every generation has the opportunity 
to update the conceptions of the framers by amending the 
Constitution; in lieu of constitutional amendment, legisla­
tion and the acts of electorally accountable agencies
articulate the current will of the people. Likewise, the 
public's failure to amend the Constitution must be inter­
preted as their acquiessence to the framers conceptions.
In addition to these two extremes views, there are more 
centrist theories, both interpretivist and noninterpreti­
vist, The centrist interpretivist theories would permit 
judges to look beyond the mere conceptions of the framers of 
the Constitution toward the concepts embodied in the text. 
Justice Hugo Black, for example, thought that the Court 
should derive these concepts from the plain meaning of the
text and then apply these concepts to the current state of
C  Qsociety. Black's jurisprudence made it impossible general­
ly to characterize him as advocating judicial restraint or 
activism. When he thought that the plain meaning of the text 
addressed a particular legal controversy, he took so
activist a stance that he was criticized for being an 
59absolutist. In other decisions, for example in Griswold
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Connecticut.^^ he demonstrated great judicial restraint when 
he thought that the particular right being advocated did not 
have a textual basis.
Black's method of interpretation reflected his resolu­
tion of the balance between democracy and individual rights 
and the other concerns that have been noted. His adherence 
to the text provided what he considered to be intelligible 
limits to both the democratic processes and the courts' 
vindication of individual rights. Likewise, he could assert 
both the importance of federalism and the supremacy of the 
Constitution, Furthermore, by permitting judges great 
latitude in applying these broad concepts to particular 
situations. Black demonstrated a good deal of faith in the 
ability of courts to limit the democratic processes.
Black's interpretational principle, however, has been 
criticized as being too simplistic,®^ As argued above, since 
the text of the Constitution cannot interpret itself, it 
would be likely that nine different justices using Black's 
principle would both understand the text and apply the 
concept derived from it in different ways. Furthermore, it 
does not explicitly provide a way to understand the concepts 
of particular provisions in their constitutional context.
Somewhere between the jurisprudential theories of Black 
and Berger lies the theory of Ronald Dworkin, Dworkin criti­
cizes both positions like Berger's that limit interpretation
62to the discovery of mere historical conceptions and the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
21
positivist positions like Black's that leave a great deal of
63the interpretation to a judge's discretion. Instead, he 
argues, judges ought to base their decisions on the concepts 
embodied in the text and fine-tune these concepts by consul­
ting the documentary materials of our political institu­
tions. Institutional materials, for Dworkin, would consist 
in prior case law, political theory, our cultural heritage,
and aspirational documents like the Declaration of 
64Independence. Judges would consult these materials in 
order to develop an overarching legal theory. When deciding 
cases, they would then determine which potential outcome of 
the case best fits this legal theory. Ultimately, Dworkin 
has asserted, one of the outcomes advocated would better fit 
this theory than any of the others and thus should be 
chosen.
Dworkin's theory is explicitly based on his evaluation
of the strengths and weaknesses of both the legislative
branch and the judiciary. Legislatures, and democratic
processes in general, he argues, are best suited to enact
"policy" whereas judges are best suited to discover and
66apply "principles." Policy takes into account the contin­
gencies of society at a particular time and represents an 
attempt to determine what is best for the general welfare. 
Principles, however, are not transitory, being grounded in a 
stable view of human nature and the rights of individuals 
implicit in that view. For Dworkin, then, individual rights.
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whether in conflict with other individuals or the 
government, are best understood and protected by the 
judiciary.
Principles or rights are not only more stable than
legislatively enacted policies but they also have a higher
priority than policies. Thus, when the two conflict, the
rights of the individual are permitted to "trump" the will
67of the majority. Judges, then, could not be activists in 
the sense of replacing legislative policies with their own, 
but only as vindicating individual rights.
Centrist noninterprevist theories do not require as 
isolated an interpretation of each provision of the text, as 
do the interpretivists examined above. They do, however, 
place more explicit limits on judicial review than Grey 
would. These limits usually consist of a unitary, substan­
tive or procedural principle of interpretation through which 
the rest of the Constitution is understood.
The best example of such a theory is that of John Hart
Ely. His principle of interpretation is what I will call the
6 8pursuit of the ideal democracy. Ely considers all of the 
other concerns of constitutional jurisprudence— individual 
rights, federalism, and the legitimate function of the judi­
ciary— subsidiary to an overarching concern to attain this 
ideal democracy. As a result, due process or equal protec­
tion, for example, are directed only toward improving the 
democratic processes and ensuring that each person has a
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right to participate in those processes; they have nothing 
to say about the outcomes of those processes,®^ Likewise, 
concerns about federalism would be reduced to a more general 
goal to facilitate democracy.
Ely places upon the courts the responsibility to faci­
litate the democratic process because of the federal courts' 
nondemocratic structure. This structure gives them the 
perspective necessary to police the democratic processes. 
Judicial review is beneficial to the democratic processes so
long as the courts do not attempt to substitute their
70judgments for the actual outcomes of these processes.
Ralph Neely, a West Virginia Supreme Court justice has
a similarly structured theory. Like Ely, he considers it to
be the courts' role to facilitate government processes:
"constitutional law is about institutions and the way they
71interact with other institutions." The primary function of
judicial review is to "bring the myth system and the opera-
72tional system into alignment." The myth system, for Neely, 
consists of our ideals about how government should function 
and what general values it should espouse.
Thus, the court has the responsibility to address the 
failures of the legislative and executive branches to 
function democratically. For example, from his own 
experience in state and national politics, Neely has 
concluded that the malfunction that most characterizes the 
legislative branch (he is referring both to Congress and his
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experience with his own state legislature) is inertia; the
legislative structure, he claims, is designed to kill bills,
73not pass them. Even when the legislature acts, its bills
very often consist of special interest legislation because
it is only the pressure of special interest groups'
lobbiests that push a bill through the process. The courts'
job would be to force the legislatures to be more concerned
with the state's general welfare by attacking special
interest legislation with the equal protection clause. The
executive branch, he believes, has the opposite problem: it
is self-serving and thus over-active. Thus, the courts
would constrain the bureaucracy by forcing them to comply
with the principles of due process.
Other theories that appeal to a single principle have
75been propounded by commentators like Harry Wechsler and 
Alexander Bickel.^® Like other centrist noninterpretivists, 
they allow for limited evolution in constitutional law. They 
do not, however, use a substantive principle of interpreta­
tion like democracy or the ideals about the operation of 
governmental institutions to structure this development. 
Both Wechsler and Bickel responded to what they considered 
the ad hoc judicial activism of the Warren Court by urging
the courts to interpret the Constitution according to
77"neutral principles" or through a "more faithful adherence
78to the method of analytical reason." Since reason or 
neutral principles would be applied to substantive texts.
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these theories closely resemble a kind of interpretivism. On
the other hand, there is the suggestion that new substantive
values might be discovered through this method since the
court is to be "the voice of reason, charged with the
creative function of discerning afresh and of articulating
79and developing impersonal and durable principles."
If Bickel's interpretational theory and his concern 
about excessive judicial review are understood together, an 
interesting balancing of jurisprudential results, Bickel's 
interpretational theory, like Dworkin's, seems to emphasize 
the unique capacity of the courts to discover, develop and 
apply principles. His theory about judicial review, on the 
other hand, is sensitive to the structural limitations of 
the courts vis-a-vis the other governmental institutions. 
The result is that the courts must use their capacities with 
prudence. If they act rashly, their power will be eroded and 
their contribution of principles to society will be of no 
consequence,
V. STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
STATE COURTS AND JURISPRUDENTIAL CONCERNS 
Now that the major concerns addressed by federal 
constitutional jurisprudential theories have been analyzed, 
it is appropriate to evaluate their relevance to state 
constitutions and state court judicial review. The 
following section will examine general features of state
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constitutions and governments. These generalizations are 
only intended to question the relevance of the complete 
adoption by states of a federal constitutional jurisprudence 
and to suggest how such theories might need to be altered in 
considering state constitutions. Thus, what follows is not a 
full-blown state constitutional jurisprudence. Since each 
state is different from the others in many important
respects, a constitutional jurisprudence must be developed
for each state. This task must be left to others.
èuL Pgmogcacy yeisyg Inaividyal Eightg
It is clear from an examination of federal constitu­
tional jurisprudence that the primary concern has been what
ought to be the relationship between democratic processes
and individual rights and what ought to be the courts' role 
in it. Although the various theories of judicial review do 
reflect their adherents' subjective valuation of the impor­
tance of democratic government or individual rights, other 
factors do enter in.
Because the federal Constitution is two hundred years 
old, extremely difficult to amend, and fundamental law for 
the entire nation, it makes uneasy those who cherish 
democracy and frustrates those who seek fundamental changes 
in national policy. Likewise, federal judicial review has an 
inherently nondemocratic, if not antidemocratic, character 
because all federal judges (though appointed and approved by
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elected officials) are not elected and serve for life. 
Consequently, these features of the federal Constitution and 
of the federal judiciary play an important role in how a 
theory limits or encourages judicial review and construes 
the constitutional text.
Most state constitutions and judiciaries do not share 
these features. To amend state constitutions, unlike the 
federal Constitution, does not require garnering as large a 
consensus throughout as large and geographically, culturally 
and politically diverse a jurisdiction. Thus, state citizens 
have a greater opportunity to amend their constitutions to 
articulate new shared ideals or individual rights. A large 
number of states in the 1970s did so. The new rights have
qual rights amendments, rights for the 
s to a clean environment, and the right of
te jurisdiction is so small, there is less 
D stating these ideals or rights either in 
cms or in very broad terms. Many state 
2 or have had very detailed constitutional
by limiting their discretion, expressed
81the branches of state government. On the 
Lative ease with which state constitutions 
ght justify greater use of broadly formu- 
Lsions and of the discretion of state 
viewing the acts of state government. A
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judicial construction of a broad constitutional provision 
that was simply out of touch with the current ideals of the 
state could be vetoed through the democratic process of 
constitutional amendâtion. An example of this dialectic 
between the judiciary and the public occurred in California
onin the early 1970s, In 1972 in People 3l«. Anderson. the
California Supreme Court declared the death penalty to be
unconstitutional. The next year, however, the people of
California overruled the court's decision, reinstating the
83death penalty by constitutional amendment.
Unlike federal judges, most state justices and judges
are either elected to the bench or subject to retention
84elections at the end of their terms. This feature of state 
judiciaries changes the antidemocratic character of judicial 
review. Nevertheless, it is not fully democratic; because 
state citizens elect judges, knowing that on occasion they 
strike down or enjoin the acts of other elected officials, 
the election of judges takes on a character different from 
the election of other officials. In the ideal, the election 
of judges represents the attempt to select persons of 
principle who in the heat of controversy will persuade the 
public to abide by the constitutional principles they have 
adopted for themselves. Thus, the election of judges, like 
the adoption of constitutional rights for individuals, 
expresses an affirmation of judicial review.
Another important distinction between federal and state
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judges is that federal judges have had solely an interpre­
tive function; they are charged with interpreting the 
Constitution, federal statutes and federal regulations,®^
State judges, however, have had a common law tradition of
8 6making law within certain fields, for example in tort law. 
This common law tradition in the state judiciaries demon­
strates two things. First, it evidences an acguiessence to a 
judicial law-making function by the public. Second, it 
proves that at least where individual rights are concerned, 
state courts have the ability and legal resources to 
construe state constitutions more broadly than the federal 
constitution may be construed by federal courts.
Federalism and State Constitutions
Although states are subdivided into counties, this
relationship between state and county governments vastly
differs from the relationship between the federal and state
87governments, called federalism. Therefore, the ways in 
which concerns of federalism affect theories of federal 
constitutional jurisprudence should be closely scrutinized 
by state courts.
One feature of this concern of federalism to protect 
state sovereignty from intrusion by the federal government 
is a mistrust about the degree of power a single court, 
namely the Supreme Court, should have over the lives of 
hundreds of millions of persons living in diverse geographi-
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o Ocal and cultural environments. Such responsibility 
requires that the Supreme Court proceed very cautiously in 
reviewing the acts of state governments and before imposing 
a narrow rule upon the agencies of fifty states. It is true 
that the Court has some structural capacity to be sensitive 
to the possible impacts of its decisions on diverse states 
since it receives a great number of amicus briefs and since 
its members, at times, have represented a cross-section of 
America. Nevertheless, the diversity of the fifty states is 
an obstacle to federal judicial activism.
Single states, on the other hand, are significantly
more homogeneous and state courts are responsible for far
fewer persons, agencies and inferior courts. Likewise, most
states have requirements that state judges have practiced in
the state before they can be appointed or elected to the
89bench. Further, in states like Montana, where there are
regions— for example, urban and rural areas— with different 
political, cultural and legal perspectives, there often is 
significant representation of those areas on the appellate 
courts. Thus, it is possible for state judges to have more
insight into the fiscal, administrative, political and
cultural character of state government and to use this 
insight in responsive judicial review.
Moreover, the ideal of federalism also has an optimis­
tic aspect in its concern for decentralization of power that 
has been often mentioned by the federal courts. Federalism
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allows and encourages the states to serve as laboratories to
test principles and policies that might someday be appli-
90cable to the entire nation. This experimental function
need not be confined to state legislatures or executive 
branches. State courts also could experiment in state
constitutional law just as in the past they have experi­
mented and learned from each other in common law. Perhaps, 
the day will come when federal courts are citing state 
constitutional case law as persuasive authority for a 
particular construction of a federal constitutional
provision.
Finally, the principle of federalism affirms the
benefits of having a federal government. The federal consti­
tutional bill of rights and the federal courts' construction 
and application of those rights will continue to serve a 
very important purpose. Just as the relatively homogeneous 
character of the states has its virtues, so too it has 
faults. Whereas certain new ideals or rights may receive a
consensus in a particular state, others which impact a very
91small minority in that state may be rejected. The federal
Constitution can serve to ensure that at least the most
fundamental rights be afforded all persons, notwithstanding
92the consensus attained in any one state. Likewise, the 
nondemocratic character of the federal judiciary might well 
complement the elected judiciaries of the states.
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gtaia Courts and Coordinate Branches af Government 
The federal Constitution assigns particular powers to 
each of the three coordinate branches of federal govern­
ment— the executive, the legislative and the judiciary. This 
specification of the legitimate powers of each of the 
branches was intended by the framers to protect the 
sovereign domain of the states by both limiting and fragmen­
ting the federal government’s powers. It is around this 
fragmentation of the powers of the federal government that 
the federal separation of power doctrine has been developed 
by the federal courts. It is the doctrine of the separation 
of powers that is invoked by the Court both when it settles 
a controversy between the other two branches and when it
defers to the prerogative of one of the branches in a
93controversy between it and a state or individual.
Because states were intended to be the primary
governments in our federal system, they had no need for such
specific grants of power or limitations. Despite a general
mistrust of government during earlier periods of state
constitution writing, some states now have very flexible
94assignments of powers to their branches of government. 
Nevertheless, a number of state constitutions, unlike the 
federal Constitution, do have an express statement regarding 
the separation of powers of the branches of state 
government. The existence of such an express statement 
could have a number of jurisprudential implications. For
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example, it could strengthen the judiciary's claim to be the 
branch to render the final interpretation about what is 
unconstitutional. Thus, it might justify zealous review of 
the coordinate branches to ensure that they are not 
exceeding their powers. Where a state constitution's provi­
sions describing the powers of the respective branches are 
very detailed, the court would most likely rely on the text. 
But where the constitution has not specified the powers of 
each, the court would have to rely on a structural analysis 
like Ely's or Neely's. From the constitutional text, and 
state history or tradition, it would have to determine what 
function the coordinate branches serve in that state.
An express separation of powers statement could also 
require judicial restraint. The constitution would prohibit 
the court from usurping the powers of another branch by 
substituting the court's judgment for the letter's. There is 
some evidence that these provisions have engendered such 
restraint in state court judicial review. One commentator, 
for example, has found that the political question doctrine 
is rigorously applied in state constitutional adjudica­
tion.^®
In addition to explicit separation of powers clauses, 
there are other significant differences between the state 
and federal structures of government that affect this juris­
prudential concern. As has been noted, state courts, unlike 
federal courts, have had a law-making function in areas of
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state law. Also, as of 1975, ten states permitted courts to
render advisory opinions at the request of the other two
97branches. Both of these features demonstrate a more active 
role for the courts in state government.
Finally, the history of state constitutions and the 
amount of federal intervention into the operations of state 
government to enforce due process and equal protection 
demonstrate that state governments are more likely to fail 
to function democratically. Perhaps, because of the homoge­
neity or the small size of state governments, they have been
more susceptible to being controlled by political
98machines. Also, state legislatures that only meet bien­
nially may have problems with delegation of their responsi-
99bilities to the executive branch. Further, some states may 
not have the resources to equip their legislatures with 
significant staffs or to administer the laws they have 
passed.
These sorts of problems have plagued the operation of 
state government in the past. If they continue, vigorous 
judicial review might be warranted. Such review, however, 
need not consist in bailing out the other branches by simply 
substituting the court's judgment for that of another 
branch; rather, it would publicly hold the legislature or an 
agency accountable to fulfill its constitutional duty.
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Justiciability!
S.ti^ngths anû. Bf@akpegs$g qâ state courts
A nonjusticiable case is one that for one reason or 
another cannot be adjudicated. Reasons cited for nonjusti­
ciability of constitutional cases have included that there 
was a lack of standing, that the controversy was not ripe, 
that the controversy was moot, and that adjudication of the 
controversy would require the court to answer a political 
q u e s t i o n . A l l  of these reasons follow from a concept of 
the court as solely a decider of controversies. As such, the 
court may interpret the law only to the extent such inter­
pretation is absolutely necessary to deciding the case. What 
these justiciability doctrines do is prevent the court from 
interpreting the constitution when there is not a real
controversy that requires a decision.
The general principles of these doctrines have been
applied by Anglo-American courts in all areas of the law.^^^ 
In federal law, however, they have taken on an additional 
significance. Article III of the federal Constitution gives 
the Supreme Court jurisdiction only over "cases or contro­
versies." Over the years, the Court has fine-tuned these 
justiciability doctrines to construe its own appellate 
jurisdiction. In addition, commentators like Bickel have
urged the Court to invoke these doctrines frequently both as 
a matter of preventing it from overstepping its legitimate 
function and as a matter of prudently conserving its
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resources.
Some state constitutions do not have express case or
102controversy requirements. Nevertheless, most state courts 
have some version of the justiciability doctrines that they 
use even in common law adjudications. It is likely, however, 
that in constitutional cases a number of state courts simply 
adopted federal standards of justiciability because since 
the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, they have often 
been called upon to hear claims based on the federal Consti­
tution, which ultimately could be appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court.
It is important that state courts that have no express 
constitutional case or controvery requirement realize that 
they may be free to adopt whatever standards of justicia­
bility they believe are consistent with the role of the 
judiciary in their state. In several areas of constitutional
law, some state courts have lower standing requirements than
103the federal courts'. Likewise, a number of states permit 
their highest courts to render advisory opinions, the very 
type of judicial activity that the federal case or 
controversy requirement is intended to prohibit
There are additional features of many state judiciaries 
and constitutions that would commend lower justiciability 
standards for litigating state constitutional questions. 
First, some state constitutions have provisions providing 
for a right to a judicial remedy for injuries to a person
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105that have been given new significance by the courts. On 
its face, such a constitutional principle seems to encourage 
adjudication.
Second, state courts do not have near the number of 
appeals that the United States Supreme Court has. Thus, 
whereas the Supreme Court may have before it a number of 
cases on a certain constitutional point appealed within a 
short span of time and thus have the opportunity to select 
the one which has best framed the issues, some state courts 
may be lucky to have a case on a particular constitutional 
provision come up every ten years. If an active state 
judiciary is called for or is, at least, consistent with the 
other jurisprudential concerns, justiciability standards may 
need to be lowered to permit the desired level of judicial 
activism.
High standards of justiciability— especially of the 
sort that Bickel advocates— therefore, might not be as 
essential for state court adjudication of state constitu­
tional issues as it is for the federal courts. The conserva­
tion of respect for the judiciary and of its resources,
which Bickel thinks justifies high justiciability standards, 
is ameliorated by the features of state courts and constitu­
tions that have been examined in the preceding subsections. 
Likewise, the greater propriety of state court activism
would justify justiciability standards no more stringent
than what would be necessary to construe adequately the
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state constitutional provision at issue.
K m. gflms fgatJiJgg QÂ Interpreting State Constitutions 
State constitutions, like the federal Constitution, do 
not contain provisions stating how the rest of the constitu­
tion should be interpreted. Certainly, the ways in which 
each state deals with the jurisprudential concerns that have 
been discussed above will fundamentally affect the princi­
ples of interpretation that are accepted in that state, just 
as they have affected principles of interpretation in 
theories of federal constitutional jurisprudence.
There are, however, several other features of some 
state constitutions not yet discussed that might affect how 
one decides to interpret those constitutions or provisions. 
First, the fact that major portions of some state constitu­
tions have been revised in the last twenty-five years^*^^ and
that many significant provisions have been added to the
107constitutions in the last fifteen years might call for a 
different method of interpretion than what might be applied 
to our two hundred year old federal Constitution that has 
received extensive judicial construction. State courts, 
faced with the prospect of interpeting their own constitu­
tions without precedent from their own courts, might lose 
their nerve and uncritically apply case law from federal 
courts or other state courts.
Despite the paucity of case law, however, recent
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constitutional provisions do have at least one advantage 
over older provisions. Because they have been passed 
recently, the court has first-hand experience of the way 
these values arose in the populace and were articulated in 
the constitution. In addition, whereas extensive historic 
research is necessary to understand the intentions of the 
framers of the federal Constitution, the delegates to a 
recent constitutional convention or the legislators who 
proposed recent amendments to it can be interviewed about 
their intentions.
Finally, though a state may not have "institutional 
materials" as rich as the Declaration of Independence or the 
Federalist Papers, judges and lawyers have a number of 
valuable resources to enrich the meaning of constitutional 
texts. For example, a state may have very sensitive histo­
rians who captured not only the events but also the very
1Û8spirit of the state. Likewise, the preamble to the 
constitution, if it is not considered legally enforceable, 
might express the tone of the rest of the constitution. 
Similarily, purpose clauses in state legislation passed 
pursuant to a particular constitutional provision can 
provide the courts with additional interpretations,
VI. CONCLUSION 
The increase in cases brought and decisions rendered on 
state constitutional grounds in the last ten years ought to
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be placed in its historical perspective. Although for most 
of this century state constitutions were overshadowed by the 
fourteenth amendment, they played a significant role in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, serving as both a model 
for the federal bill of rights and a basis for judicial 
review.
In addition to reflecting on the historical roots of 
state constitutions and state court judicial review, lawyers 
and judges should begin to develop a constitutional juris­
prudence for their state constitution. A constitutional 
jurisprudence will enable judges to approach their constitu­
tion with a theory that takes into account both the consti­
tution and its cultural, historical, and political context. 
Well developed theories of constitutional jurisprudence will 
both inhibit ad hoc interpretations (or at least attempt to 
justify them) and provide a context for debate about the 
assumptions that judges inevitably make in deciding whether 
to engage in judicial review and how to interpret a consti­
tutional provision.
Although theories of federal constitutional jurispru­
dence provide important materials for developing a state 
constitutional jurisprudence, the configuration of jurispru­
dential concerns that the federal theories address must be 
distinguished from the configurations posed by state consti­
tutions and judicial review by state courts. By critically 
examining theories of federal constitutional jurisprudence.
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State courts will be better able to evaluate the persuasive­
ness of federal case authority in construing a state 
constitutional provision. Such an analysis may also reveal 
jurisprudential questions and concerns unique to state 
constitutions and point the way toward developing a state 
constitutional jurisprudence.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42
NOTES
1. Jurisprudence can be "analytical . . . [which] is
concerned with the clarification of the general 
framework of legal thought H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW (preface) (1981) Or, it can be critical, 
that is, it is an attempt to criticize how our laws, do 
in fact hang together, and to suggest what overarching 
principles ought to be reflected in the structure and 
content of our laws.
2. See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL 
POLITICAL PROCESS 1 (1980).
3. Judge Browning's remarks were made at a conference 
entitled, "Standards and Limits for Judicial 
Decisionmaking— A Conference on Jurisprudence," held at 
the University of Montana Law School,
4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). For a good analysis of 
this decision, see Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide ta 
Marbury ^  Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 17.
5. For a discussion of the role of theory in scientific 
research, see T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
6. For an attempt to use the study of literature in 
teaching legal analysis and writing, see J. White, THE 
LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973).
7. For a good statement of this "legal realist" claim, see
Pound, The Call for a. Realist Jurisprudence. 44 HARV.
L. REV. 697 (1931) .
8. But compare Ronald Dworkin's apparent conviction that 
a "Herculean" jurisprudence could lead to the "right" 
decision in a case. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 
81-130 (1977). For a criticism of this view, see Hart, 
American Jurispxudengg Thxaüah English Eygs.; Ths. 
Nightmare and. ihs. NoJals. Dxsam, n  GA. L. rev. 969, 982- 
986 (1977).
9. This would enrich the legal principle that there ought 
not to be ex post facto laws.
10. A good indication of this is the degree to which
lawyers continue to neglect pleading state constitu­
tional or statutory grounds in addition to federal 
constitutional grounds. Some state courts have begun to 
require that state grounds be considered first. See
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Carson, Ila&L Ihipgg Last"; & Methodological Approach 
to. LÊSâl argument in state courts, 19 WILLIAMETTE L.J. 641 (1983)
11. S§3j, Ŝ .3̂  t Brennan, State Constitutions and tbê
Prgtgstiçn af indlYidnal Rights, 90 h a r v . l , r e v . 489
(1977); Howard, State Courts and Constitntional Rights 
In Da% a£ tha Bntaat Canttf 62 va. l. rev. 873 
(1976) ; Wilkes, Tha New Federalism la Cflmijial 
pggsadmg.; Stata C.ouxt Eaaaian al tha Burger Sourt r 62 KY. L.J. 421 (1974).
12. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304
(1816) and Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 V^eat) 264 
(1821) (establishing the constitutional power of the 
Supreme Court to review decisions of state courts).
13. Saa W. ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS:
REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OP THE STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 5 (1980); B.
SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
234-379 (1971) (for the texts of the state bills of
rights).
14. SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 289 (Connecticut and Rhode 
Island).
15. Saa p. SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY AND
NARRATIVE HISTORY 37-39 (1980); C. WILTSE, THE
JEFFERSONIAN TRADITION IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 37 (1935).
16. See ADAMS, supra note 13, at 20 (the colonists 
considered some of Parliament's acts void); See also 
the colonists 1765 Declaration of Rights and 
Grievances, which expressed their concern about the 
arbitrariness of the Crown's rule of the colonies. 
Schwartz, supra note 13, at 197-199.
17. Saa A. SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 91-100 
(1965).
18. See ADAMS, suora note 13, at 125-128, 308-311. For an 
example of how the states experimented and borrowed 
ideas from each other in this process, see SCHWARTZ, 
supra note 13, at 374.
19. ADAMS, supra note 13, at 295-311.
20. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 17, at 180; SMITH, supra 
note 15, at 288 (Madison presented a list of rights 
essentially identical to the Virginia state bill of
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rights).
21. 8 Rep. 114 a, 2 Brown 255, 77 Eng. Rep. 647 (1610) For
a discussion of its influence on Americans, see
SUTHERLAND, supra note 17, at 62,
22. SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 403.
23. For a discussion of judicial review, see THE FEDERALIST 
No. 78, at 485-486 (A, Hamilton)(Lodge ed, 1888).
24. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
25. 32 U.S. (7-Pet.) 242 (1833).
26. See, e.g., Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856).
27. See, e.g.. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
28. See Paulsen, Substantive Due Process In the States. 34 
MINN. L, REV. 91 (1950); See also Developments in the LawczThs qâ Slats CQ.Daliim i<anal Eighla,95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1463-1493 (1982).
29. SfiS. generally C. ANTIEAU, RELIGION UNDER STATE
CONSTITUTIONS (1965).
30. See, e.g.. McClure v. State, 9 Tenn. 206 (1829).
31. See. e.g.. Hroneck v. People, 134 111. 139, 24 N.E. 861
(1890) .
32. See, e.g.. Dole v. Allen, 4 Me. 527 (4 Greanleaf
455)(1827) .
33. See, e.g.. Dailey v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. 94, 44 P. 
458 (1896)(right to stage a play based on defendant's
story, during defendant's trial); State v. Sykes, 28 
Conn. 225 (1859)(state prohibition of the sale of
lottery tickets does not violate the right to a free 
press).
34. See, e.g.. St. Louis v. Roche, 128 Mo. 541, 31 S.w, 915 
(1895)(law that makes associating with reputed thieves 
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I, INTRODUCTION
In 1969 Congress passed the National Environmental 
Policy Act^ and ushered the nation into a decade marked by a 
concern for the protection of the natural environment.
Subsequent legislation promoted protection and improvement
2 2 of air and water quality, set aside wilderness areas, and
sought the protection of endangered species.^ These laws
reflected a growing awareness in American culture of both
the importance of the natural environment to human beings
and its fragility.
Some environmentalists, however, have been disappointed 
with the narrow interpretations given to these laws by
5agencies and the courts. This paper, however, is not 
concerned primarily with the sheer effectiveness of current 
laws to protect the natural environment. Rather, it is 
intended to examine a deeper question that once raised, 
might challenge the priority that sheer effectiveness has as 
the criterion for what constitutes "good" environmental 
laws.
Once goodness is conceived of as something more than 
mere efficiency, arguments that rely on a conception of law 
as purely instrumental fail. A richer conception of law 
acknowledges both its regulatory and its expressive 
character. Legislators and lawyers who hold this richer 
conception are concerned about not only producing a 
particular outcome but also accurately expressing the moral
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insight that prompted their desire for that particular 
outcome. Ultimately, this distinction between the regulatory 
and expressive functions of law is blurred when a law is 
internalized by persons as a result of both functions. The 
affect of mass culture on our conduct demonstrates the 
potential importance of this expressive function of law on 
our internalization of it. Thus, a law or interpretation of 
a law that meaningfully expresses our moral intuitions, at 
least in the long run, will render its regulatory function 
more efficacious.^
It is this expressive character of law, then, that will 
be addressed in this paper. The inquiry will be about what 
kind of law or interpretation of law best expresses our 
environmental concern, given the political structure and 
tradition of the United States.
Prom an examination of environmental laws and other 
legal theories proposed to protect the environment, two 
different ways of understanding environmental concern will 
briefly be described. The first is what I call a homocentric 
conception. It will be argued that our environmental 
legislation, because of the utilitarian nature of the 
legislative process, necessarily expresses a homocentric 
conception. It will also be argued that even though at least 
two legal scholars, Christopher Stone and Laurence Tribe, 
attempt to rescue environmental concern from the utilitarian 
predicament by recognizing "rights" possessed by nonhuman
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entities, their rights are also homocentric and thus fail to 
account for our deepest concern for the environment.
To understand the nature of the second kind of 
conception, a recent first amendment law suit brought by
Americans Indians will be analyzed. Their legal theory for 
the protection of the natural environment flows directly 
from their religious conception of it. It will be argued 
that this religious foundation for environmental concern is 
neither homocentric nor misanthropic and that the first 
amendment thus provides an appropriate legal expression of 
environmental concern,
II, A HOMOCENTRIC ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN 
For the last five hundred years in western
civilization, law has been a homocentric enterprise. By 
homocentric, I mean that it has been solely concerned with 
the perceived needs and wants of persons, Homocentrism
resulted from a radical dichotomy between persons, who
npossessed minds, and nonpersons, which did not. 
Consequently, the notion that persons have obligations 
towards nonpersons has been, for the most part, meaningless. 
Before the modern era, however, nonpersons were 
meaningful. Although persons were certainly considered to be 
the most important beings in the world, there existed a 
hierarchical understanding of the world which recognized 
both degrees of intrinsic significance of other beings and a 
continuity or interconnectedness between persons and the
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grest of the world. This understanding of a person's
relationship with the world resulted from the theocentric
character of the ancient and medieval worlds. This
theocentricity was also expressed in the inseparability of
religious and civil laws in early ancient civilization.^
In the context of jurisprudence, the modern separation
of the sacred and the mundane was made possible by Thomas
Aquinas late in the medieval era when he made a distinction
between divine and human law.^® Even so, St. Thomas'
philosophy clearly contemplated the participation of human
and natural law in eternal law. Thus, for him, law was
ultimately theocentric.
The seeds, however, were sown; after the Renaissance,
the Reformation, and the birth of modern science the
relationship between the deity, persons and the world was
s e v e r e d . T h e  world was conceived to be a great impersonal
12machine; only persons had ethical significance. In the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries this ethical signifi­
cance of persons was expressed in the recognition that they
13possessed rights.
Likewise, utilitarianism, a major political philosophy 
that arose in the nineteenth century and that undergirds the 
structure of our political processes, has not escaped 
homocentrism. Because its ethical criterion is based on the 
measurement of pleasure and pain, utilitarianism has the
potential of taking into account the needs at least of all
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sentient creaturesNevertheless, such an environmental 
ethic is homocentric because it merely extends an ethic for 
relationships between persons to a relationship between 
persons and some of the entities of the natural environment. 
Despite this homocentricity— in fact, as a direct result of 
it— a utilitarian environmental concern seems to provide a 
way to understand environmental concern that is both philo­
sophically satisfying and legally efficacious.
But utilitarianism is unsatisfactory in two major
respects, due to its homocentrism. First, because it is
based on human experience, albeit sentience, the range of an
ethics that can only take account of pleasure and pain is
15limited to sentient entities. Although protection of the 
pristine state of nonsentient entities could be urged as 
necessary, for example, to protect the habitat of sentient 
entities, utilitarianism cannot address directly one's moral 
intuition about the inherent significance of the pristine 
character of nonsentient entities like a mountain or river.
The second flaw of a utilitarian theory is that it 
provides for the valuation of pleasure and pains. Valuation 
of the pleasure or pain of sentient nonhuman entities is 
extremely difficult. Whereas the commonality of human 
experience might enable us to sympathize with the pain or 
pleasure that our acts might cause other persons, we can 
empathize with nonhuman entities only by conceiving of them 
as human-like, a tendency which has the potential for
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disastrous ecological results*^® Conversely, the valuation
of pleasures and pains and our inability to measure them in
nonhuman entities permits us to minimize the pleasure or
pain to nonhuman entities caused by our acts. Thus, the
effect upon the natural environment is rendered
insignificant to the overall calculation by legislators of
the pleasures and pains that would be generated by a 
17proposed law.
Reflecting the homocentric character of both natural
rights and utilitarianism, our laws and jurisprudence
pertain only to persons. The rest of the world is understood
18to be the property of persons. while the scope of who 
counts as a person and of what constitutes a person's
igproperty gradually has been enlarged, the dichotomy
between persons and nonpersons has remained much the same.
The environmental legislation that was passed in the 1970s,
though providing legal cognizance of a person's interests in
20a clean, healthful environment and in the cultural and
21aesthetic benefits of wilderness and of the preservation
2 2of species, embodies a concern for the environment only to
the extent that persons derive benefit from it. Thus,
environmental concern has been understood as something like
23a collective property interest. Furthermore, even these 
property rights to a natural environment have not been 
accorded a fundamental status that is protected by the 
Constitution. Rather, they are merely the expression of
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public policy. As such, their continued existence and
enforcement may vacillate with public opinion and are
subject to the pressures of special interests.
At least one scholar, Mark Sagoff, however, has
attempted to anchor these cultural and aesthetic values in
the Constitution, and thus to make the protection of the
natural environment less susceptible to the utilitarian
character of the political processes,^"* But because, for
Sagoff, the protection of the environment is the result of
the constitutional protection of human ideals— justice,
integrity, power— that are symbolized for us by entities of
25the natural environment, his theory is thoroughly 
homocentric and fails to account for the inherent 
significance of the natural environment. Indeed, this
idealism is potentially more homocentric than utili­
tarianism, which can at least take into account the pains 
and pleasures of nonhuman entities irrespective of their 
human value.
Spurred by the environmental concern that has been
expressed in the last decade, legal theorists have attempted
to restructure our jurisprudence and moral theories to
remedy the inadequacies of our legal heritage. Among such
attempts are Christopher Stone's article. Should Trees Have
26Standinqj Tgyaxd L&aal Eighth far Nafiiral ûtûsats, and
Laurence Tribe's article, my,8 Nat ta IhiDt Atailt Eiastig.
27Trees: New Foundations far En.yl,ranm,8ntal Law. Their
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concern is to place the protection of the environment on a 
jurisprudential foundation firmer than the utilitarian 
process. They appeal to our natural rights ideals for this 
foundation. Recognizing that traditionally only persons have 
been accorded rightsr they argue that rights should be 
accorded to nonhuman entities.
In his article. Hays, ta Ihiük. Ab.ou.t .Plastis îtsâs, 
Laurence Tribe incorporates into his own views Christopher 
Stone's thesis that rights should be accorded to natural
objects. Although Stone does not altogether ignore the
28philosophical implications of his rights thesis, his
article is primarily directed toward practical objections to
according rights to natural objects. Tribe, on the other
hand, attempts to place the discussion of the notion of
rights for natural objects within a larger philosophical and
jurisprudential context. In a subsequent article he also
describes a constitutional basis for implementing these 
29notions. For this reason, the following discussion will 
focus on Tribe's thesis and address Stone's article only
where appropriate.
Tribe's thesis may be summarized as follows. Since the 
analytic techniques that are employed in government policy 
analysis— market theory, cost-benefit analysis, etc.— are 
based on reason and are, therefore, value neutral, "there is 
nothing in the structure of the techiniques themselves or in 
the logical premises on which they rest, which inherently
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precludes their intelligent use by a public decisionmaker in
the service of these 'intangible' or otherwise 'fuzzy'
concerns," such as the significance of current decisions for
future generations or other species.
The difficulties that are currently encountered in the
use of these analytic techniques to evaluate such intangible
concerns may be overcome by broadening our political and
cultural perspective and by heightening the power of these
techniques to express this new perspective. The obstacle to
the development of heightened analytical techniques is that
they are currently employed in a "social, political and
intellectual tradition which . . .  perceives the only
legitimate task of reason to be that of consistently
identifying and then serving individual appetite,
31preference, or desire,"
Tribe diagnoses this tradition to be the result of a
"disintegration of reason" rooted in a "religious
32transformation." Human reason, which prior to the modern
era had been considered to be "guided by the divine," became
the slave of "ends ultimately private to each person and
empty of intrinsic significance because not derived through
33any dialogue beyond the self." This debasement of reason 
was accompanied by an intense consciousness of transcendence 
which "posit[ed] the radical dichotomy between God and 
world, between heaven and earth, and . . . between soul and 
body."^^
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Although diagnosing that our world-view displays
symptoms of an inordinate emphasis on transcendence. Tribe
warns that it would be a mistake to return to a primitive
experience of the immanence of the world:
[T]he sanctification of nature or of *natural 
principles,' even if achievable and even if 
effective in actually protecting natural systems, 
would simply return us to the religious tradition 
that preceded transcendence, the tradition in 
which the divine, far from an other-worldly 
essence, was immanent in all that is."
He fears that "treating the existing order as sacred .
might well relegate to permanent subjection many of those
who are not now among the privileged, freezing the social
36evolution of humanity into its contemporary mold,"
Tribe seeks to synthesize the consciousnesses of
transcendence and immanence. Such a synthesis would
acknowledge human freedom and the constraints of principles:
To be free . . .  is to choose what we shall value; 
to feel that coherence over time and community 
with others while experiencing freedom is to 
choose in terms of shared commitments to 
principles outside ourselves; to make commitments 
without destroying freedom is to live by 
principles that are capable of evolution as we 
change in the process of pursuing them.
The articulation of principles and the sharing of a
commitment to them "may be augered by the dawning of
38environmental awareness in contemporary law and culture."
It is the task of law and culture both to "embody a sense of
reverence for whatever stands beyond human manipulation" and
to take "a stance of criticism toward all that is given and
39a commitment to the conscious improvement of the world."
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
11
At a minimum, we must begin to extricate our 
nature-regarding impulses from the conceptually 
oppressive sphere of human want satisfaction, by 
encouraging the elaboration of perceived 
obligations to plant and animal life and to 
objects of beauty in terms that do not falsify 
such perceptions from the very beginning by 
insistent 'reference to human interests.'
For this reason. Tribe adopts Christopher Stone's thesis
that natural objects should be accorded rights.
Stone argues that it would not be inconsistent with the
historical broadening of the class of persons who have been
accorded rights to extend rights to natural objects.
However, rather than critically examining the philosophic
foundations of the notion of rights. Stone primarily
attempts to rebut the practical objections to granting
rights to natural objects. The centerpiece of his thesis is
that the rights of natural objects would be exercised and
defended on their behalf by human guardians who would assess
and zealously pursue whatever might be in the best interest
42of those natural objects.
One of Stone's arguments for recognizing natural 
objects as possessors of rights is that only by doing so can 
we fully take into account actual or potential damage to the 
environment."*^ His ultimate hope, however, is that such 
changes in the law and stirrings of human empathy "can be 
coalesced into a radical new theory or myth— felt as well as 
intellectualized— of man's relationships to the rest of 
nature.
Tribe also emphasizes the need for the development of
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the powers of human empathy through contemplating the needs 
that humans share with other animals and plants. In 
addition, he suggests that ” [t]he very process of treating 
some places with respect may itself reveal and ever create 
conceptual possibilities beyond our conceptual 
possibilities,
In a subsequent article. Tribe suggests the role that
the Constitution might play in this evolution of a new
consciousness. As part of a "structural due process" the
Court would strike down rules "as violative of due process,
laws that make sense— but that make 'sense' only in terms of
values and conceptions so out of touch with contemporary
ideas that government is no longer willing to press such
46values and conceptions in the laws' defense." Presumably,
the use of structural due process by the courts to protect
the environment would require that those new "conceptual 
possibilities," he speaks of in his first article, be widely 
adopted by the public.
Tribe's attempt to wrest our tradition from the want- 
centered homocentrism fails for three reasons. First, his 
lopsided faith in reason makes impossible the synthesis of 
transcendence and immanence that he desires. Second, the 
location of a nonrational source of environmental concern in 
the faculty of human empathy is no less homocentric. Third, 
Stone's rights-thesis, which Tribe adopts, has too much 
homocentric philosophical baggage to serve as a foundation
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for our deepest environmental concern.
Tribe's optimism about the powers of reason permeates
his entire discussion. Although he acknowledges that it has
become instrumental and has lost its power to generate 
47ends, his extensive discussion about the potential of
analytic techniques solely treats reason as instrumental.^^
On the other hand, he speaks of "bodies of principle which
we perceive as external to our choices and by which we feel
bound" but does not describe the source of these "bodies of
principles.Presumably, they are "generated by reason"
for the "purpose of reason is to evolve a comprehensive
understanding of mankind's place in the universe . . .
To obscure the matter further, Tribe states that "we must be
52able to reason about what to choose."
Tribe, therefore, has used reason in three senses: it
generates bodies of principle, it enables us to choose
values in terms of these principles, and as an analytical
tool it allows for the implementation of these values. He
has not, however, specified whether these three powers of
reason are related and how they relate to experience.
The problem with Tribe's notion of reason is that it
stands alone. Though admitting that at one time reason was
perceived as guided by the divine, and rejecting Hume's
contention that it should be guided by passion. Tribe
53apparently has opted for reason guided by reason. Tribe
perceives "intrinsic significance— sanctity, if you will— in
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the very principles . . . according to which we orchestrate
our relationships with one another and with the physical
world of which we are a part" rather than in the
relationships themselves.
Similarly, Tribe attempts to found the significance of
other species of life in the human capacity to empathize
with them, "As least so long as we remain within empathizing
distance of the objects whose rights we seek to recognize,
it seems reasonable to expect the acknowledgment of .
rights [for natural objects] to be regarded as more than
55fictitious," Since Tribe conceives the powers of empathy
C £to rely on similarities between humans and other species,
it is a thoroughly homocentric source of concern. This
homocentrism becomes even more evident, when one considers
the utilitarian origins of our modern notion of empathy. The
utilitarian conception of moral obligation is that it is
merely a sentiment possessed by humans, rather than an
obligation that is rooted either in those to whom there is
the obligation or in a transcendent third entity, such as
57natural law or God,
Tribe's emphasis on the power of reason and human
empathy is accompanied by a subtle rejection of the claims
of the nonhuman or a transcendent "Other," such as a
58divinity. Both transcendent divinity and immanent 
divinity^^ are rejected.
Thus, Tribe rules out the only way to make sense of an
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environmental concern that is not homocentric. What he needs 
to recognize is that what is most significant about our 
experience of the natural environment is that it is able to 
stir within us a nonhomocentric vision. It is such a vision, 
not human reason itself, that may be the source of moral 
insight.
In reflecting on his own experience with wilderness, 
Henry Bugbee, in an article entitled. Wilderness in
fi nAmerica, articulates a nonhomocentric understanding of the
natural environment. He asks the question: "How does nature
speak to our concern?"^^ His inquiry begins with the
realization that "[i}f wilderness may yet speak to us and
place us as respondents in the ambience of respect for the
wild— for Nature as primordial, it must be liberated from
62ultimate subsumption to human enterprise," Wilderness must
fibe encountered with "disinterested interest," By so
approaching it,
[o]ne is brought to realize one is held within the 
embrace of what is proffered in its being
proffered. No behind or beyond things themselves.
The givens of life are laid down. The 
foundations of the world are laid. Things are in 
place and stand firm. Beings stand forth on their 
own. They do not ask our leav|. They invite 
mutuality. That measure of trust.
To permit "[b]eings [to] stand forth on their own" and
to acknowledge the otherness of the natural environment will
not, as Tribe fears, require us to abdicate our humanity, 
Homocentrism must not be confused with a legitimate
expression of our humanity. Whereas homocentrism squelches
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the voice of the natural environment, our humanity is
affirmed in this "partnership of man and n a t u r e . O u r
encounter with the natural environment will engage all of
our human faculties, including the transcendental powers of
human reason, and thus evoke a uniquely human response.
Even as the things of the place command attention 
in the presencing of the world they are discovered 
to us from within the depth of responsiveness in 
confirmation of our mutuality with them . In
this fashion we are ordained in responsible 
relationships with beings given into our keeping 
inthe very presencing of the world. The mystery of 
this, it would seem, can only deepen, and with its 
deepening enhance the sense the world might make.
But one is charged to make good on that sense, and 
in the mainstream of human destiny within which 
its implications require to be worked out— within 
the full gamut of ambiguities, of perplexities and 
of thgg anguish that prevail in the received 
world,®®
Though Tribe aspires to a treatment of the natural
environment that "reveal[s] and ever create[s] conceptual
67possibilities beyond our conceptual possibilities," this 
very expression of his aspiration in its speaking only about 
the concepts has a hollow ring. It does not take seriously 
enough the profundity of the natural environment's speaking. 
Furthermore, it stands in stark contrast to Tribe's 
understanding of human reason that has been analyzed above, 
if, as he also suggests, reason generates moral principles. 
Likewise, there is something amiss in his and Stone's 
rights-thesis. To be sure, according rights to nonhuman 
entities is an expression of respect for a mutuality between 
ourselves and nature, Similarily, as a legal device, the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
17
recognition of such rights would have the practical 
advantages that Stone suggests and could also be a 
provisional measure to instill within us a receptivity to 
the significance of the natural environment. The problem 
with the rights-thesis, however, is that its philosophical 
foundations are thoroughly homocentric. Thus, for it to 
account for our deepest concern for the natural environment, 
a total reconstruction of our understanding of rights would 
be required.
This reconstruction would be necessary because the very 
idea of rights has traditionally rested on a radical 
distinction between persons and nonpersons on the grounds 
that persons possess reason. Both Locke and Kant, whose 
political philosophies have significantly influenced our 
legal notion of rights, distinguished persons from
nonpersons because of persons' possession of reason. For
68Locke, we "are born free as we are born rational" and this
natural freedom is the source of our "rights and
69privileges." The rest of the world, however, is merely 
property given by God to humans "to make use of it to the
best advantage of life and convenience."^®
Kant's ethics is best known for the principle that 
persons should not be treated merely as means but also as
ends.^^ The source of this moral significance of persons, 
for Kant, is their rationality: "man and generally any
rational being exists as an end in himself . . . [since]
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72rational nature exists as an end in itself," On the other
hand, "[b]eings whose existence depends not on our will but
on nature's, have nevertheless, if they are irrational
beings, only a relative value as means and are therefore
called things,
Likewise, Mill's utilitarian account of liberty
requires a rational subject. Liberty, for Mill, "comprises,
first, the inward domain of consciousness , , , Prom
this flows the concept of individual sovereignty; "Over
himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is 
75sovereign." The utility generated by this liberty of
persons is so great that "the sole end for which mankind are
warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with 
the liberty of action of any of their number is self- 
protection,"
In addition to contradicting with our notions about
rights, treating natural objects as possessors of rights
might also distort the character of nature. Our notion of
rights not only involves the glorification of human reason
but also has an individualistic quality since rights are
those claims which individuals have against other
individuals or society as a whole. Conversely, the natural
world, at least from an ecological perspective, is not
simply a collection of individuals; rather, it has a
77symbiotic character.
Although radical changes in our notion of rights might
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be possible— perhaps, as a result of according rights to
nature objects— it makes more sense in both the short run
and the long run to consider an environmental concern in a
different sense. Perhaps, as John Rodman has suggested, in
the process of rethinking our relations with other species,
"we [will] discover anew that nonhuman species have their
own structures and tendencies that have been systematically
frustrated and distorted by the imposition of homocentric 
78teleologies," In being receptive to these tendencies and
structures of nonhuman species we might enrich our own.
What is needed, then, is not an escape from our
humanity but a new conception and experience of what it
means to be human— a conception and experience that takes
into account the intrinsic significance of the nonhuman
world. The enrichment of our notions of what it means to be
human and of what is our relationship to the natural
environment, however, is not to be found solely in our
exercise of the critical powers of reason. Reason cannot
generate an environmental concern. Environmental concern
begins with and grows out of a response with one's whole
being, including one's reason, to the natural environment;
this response is contemplative rather than critical or
teleological. It is through contemplation that we hearken to
the natural world and open ourselves to the possibility of
insight into our relationship with it and, as Bugbee 
79suggests, with each other.
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III. A RELIGIOUS BASIS PGR ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN
It is in Tribe's rejection of divinity— immanent and 
transcendent— that his theory becomes homocentric. His 
article simply calls for a very sophisticated homocentric 
understanding of the natural environment where it has 
utilitarian value as not only a material resource but also 
an aesthetic and cultural resource. Without a notion of 
divinity, the environment can only be accounted for by 
analogizing it to, or placing its telos in, persons. In 
contrast, even solely transcendent or immanent religions 
have the theological potential to account for a significance 
to the natural environment apart from any reference to 
persons.
Purely transcendent or immanent religious responses to 
the world, as Tribe points out, are problematic and a 
synthesis of these reponses suggests a richer and more 
satisfying account of the world and our relationship with 
it. The question posed by my criticism of Tribe, however, is 
whether the sacredness of the environment results from our 
treating it as sacred or, conversely, whether we ought to 
treat it with respect because it is sacred. The former 
alternative, I have argued, is unsatisfactory philosophical­
ly and thus provides a poor legal expression of our deepest 
concern for the natural environment.
A more satisfying understanding of the our relationship 
with the natural environment would entail an understanding
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of divinity that embodied the synthesis of transcendence and 
immanence that Tribe seeks. Such a religious understanding 
of our environmental concern, though it would challenge the 
homocentric character of our political institutions, would 
not be entirely inconsistent with them, A recent first
amendment case, Mplthw^st iDdlan CamstSfy Asaflglatigp 3Lt.
80Peterson, where the court upheld the claim of some 
American Indians that the degradation of the pristine 
quality of the natural environment in a particular location 
would violate their right to the free exercise of their 
religion, demonstrates this assertion. This recent case was 
not decided, however, in a vacuum. Although prior courts in 
the 1970s, faced with similar claims, had great difficulties 
understanding American Indian religions and how the first 
amendment could protect them, a foundation was laid for the 
success of the American Indian claims in Northwest Indian
Csm&L&cy.
Before these first amendment cases are considered, 
however, it is revealing to examine briefly how for most of 
the history of the United States an exploitive, 
disrespectful attitude towards the environment has 
accompanied the attempt by our government to suppress 
American Indian religions. After these cases have been 
analyzed, a survey of central features of American Indian 
religions will suggest how some of the problems with 
understanding environmental concern that Tribe attempts to
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solve are addressed by a religious understanding of the
natural environment.
Although national laws in the last fifteen years have
expressed a concern for both protecting the natural
environment and ensuring the free exerise of American Indian 
81religionsr throughout most of the history of the United
States the policies of the government have been antithetical
to both concerns. Beginning with the first colonists, the
attitudes of white Americans towards the American Indian
religion/culture and their feelings about the vast
wilderness of North America coalesced. The European
discoverers and colonists were motivated, in part, by their
religious aspirations to convert the heathen and to take
dominion of New World in the name of their God. Because of
their notions of property, these transplanted Europeans
looked upon wilderness as a wasteland, which was in need of
redemption through cultivation and development. A governor
of the Indiana Territory stated:
Is one of the fairest portions of the globe to 
remain in a state of nature, the haunt of a few 
wretched savages, when it seems destined by the 
Creator to give support to a large population and 
to be the seatgOf civilization, of science and of 
true religion.
Consequently, the American Indians, who were at home in
this fallen wasteland, were considered wasteful and 
83wanton.
The history of the American Indian from the 
establishment of colonies in the New World until the 1930s
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was marked by the step-by-step appropriation of their 
hunting, fishing, gathering, and cultivation grounds by 
white Americans. Even the reformers of the 19th century, who 
were sincerely concerned about the atrocities committed 
against the Indians, conceived of the Christian religion and 
the individualistic, agricultural/industrial culture as the 
same. The removal of the Indians onto small reservations, 
therefore, was intended not only to open up large tracts of 
land for white settlement but also to break down the nomadic
Q Aand tribal religion/culture of the Indians, Similar
justifications were made for the Army's slaughter of the
buffalo, the primary source of food for the Plains 
85Indians,
The American Indian religions were attacked in other
ways, as well. Prom President Washington's administration
until well into this century, the policies of the federal
government were wedded to the evangelical programes of
86missionary societies. Not only were the American Indians
systematically proselytized under the auspices of the
federal government, but the government also took aggressive
steps to prohibit Indian dances, ceremonies, and rituals and
to deter Indian children from learning their traditional
87languages and culture.
This correlation between our treatment of the 
environment and our failure to accord American Indian 
religions the first amendment protection that they deserved
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is itself suggestive of the inherent connection between 
environmental concern and American Indian religions. Thus, 
just as the national oppression of American Indians
reflected an exploitive attitude towards the natural
environment, the political and judicial protection of 
American Indian religion in the 1970s reflected a new sense 
of concern for the environment. Given the importance of the 
actual treatment and quality of the environment to American
Indian religious practices, it has been inevitable that a
constitutional commitment to the protection of the exercise 
of their religion should result in the protection of the 
natural environment. Further-, as will be argued below, it is 
appropriate that this constitutional protection of religious 
practices results in the protection of the natural 
environment.
The development of first amendment protection of Indian
religions, however, began with practices that did not affect
land use, Indians have prevailed in suits challenging
prohibitions against wearing their hair in religiously
88significant styles, challenging the prohibition of the use
89of peyote as a sacrament in religious ceremonies, and
justifying violations of fish and game laws where the acts
90were necessary for religious practices.
Because of white culture's traditional views about the 
environment and its ignorance about American Indian values, 
the first American Indian first amendment claims that sought
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the protection of the environment were not successful.
Though the courts in these prior cases did not absolutely
preclude the possibility that such claims might prevail
under different circumstances, their opinions demonstrated
both the difficulties they had in comprehending the
character of American Indian religions and a commitment to a
homocentric understanding of the natural environment.
The first confusion introduced into the analysis was
the notion of property interests. The first two district
courts to hear such cases dismissed them because the Indians
did not have a property interest in the lands, the sacred
91quality of which they sought to protect. Such a confusion
evidenced a complete misunderstanding about the claimants'
religious attitude towards the environment. Although both of
the circuit courts of appeal to which these cases were
appealed rejected the district courts' claims that lack of
property interests in and of themselves barred the first
amendment claims, the circuit courts did not altogether
abandon property concepts. They stated that property
interests still would be factors in an analysis of such
92first amendment claims.
The second problem with such claims has been the 
courts' mistaken attempts to distinguish between Indian 
culture or heritage and their religion. It is on this basis 
that one circuit court of appeals dismissed the Indians' 
claim.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
26
The overwhelming concern of the affiants appears 
to be related to the historical beginnings of the 
Cherokees and their cultural development. It is 
damage to tribal and family folklore and
traditions, more than particular religious
observances, which appears to be at stake. The
complaint asserts an "irreversible loss to the 
culture and history of the plaintiffs." Though
cultural history and tradition are vitally 
important to any group of people, these are not 
interests protected by the Free Exercise Clause of 
the First Amendment.
A third problem has been the addition of a questionable 
new prong to the first amendment analysis that would enable 
courts to scrutinize the religious practices in question and 
to decide whether a person's religion has been burdened. 
Utilizing language from prior first amendment cases, the 
courts held that the religious practice or sacred location
in question must be "central or indispensible" to the
94plaintiff's religion. Although this prong may be a 
necessary check on the scope of the first amendment, it 
could be devastating to religious practices that differ from 
the Judaeo-Christian tradition's emphasis on the centrality 
of spiritual and intellectual religious expression.
Finally, when such first amendment claims have involved 
a request to regulate tourist access to or behavior around 
sacred grounds that desecrates those grounds— for example, 
littering or operating noisy motor vehicles— the courts have
rebutted those claims by raising the spectre of the
95Establishment Clause. Their contention has been that to 
regulate the access or behavior of others would be to 
involve the government in the maintenance of a "religious
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shrine"— a clear violation of the Establishment Clause.
What is remarkable about the court's decision in
HorthwgSt Indian Cemetery is that although the court applied
the analyses of these preceding cases, it decided in favor
of the American Indian plaintiffs. This is because it
demonstrated a willingness to comprehend the religious
significance of the natural environment to the religions of
the claimants.
In Moxihygsi Indian Cgmeteiy the Forest Service had
adopted a forest management plan to construct a road and to
harvest timber in a National Forest in California
inventoried as a roadless area. Members of several Indian
tribes challenged this decision, contending that it would
amount to a burden upon their first amendment rights. They
argued that for centuries their tribes had used the high
country in this pristine area for religious purposes. The
court accepted their claim that:
the area considered sacred encompasses an entire 
region rather than simply a group of individual 
sites . . . [and that] [for those Indians who]
hike into the high country and use 'prayer seats' 
to seek religious guidance or personal 
'power' through 'engaging in emotional [and] 
spiritual exchange with the creator," [sjuch 
exchange is made possible by the solitude, 
quietness an|gpristine environment found in the 
high country.
Like prior courts, the Northwest Ipdlaa CglBgtery court 
made a determination concerning the centrality of the high 
country to the religion of these tribal members. Unlike
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prior courts, it found that the high country was "central 
and indispensable" to the plaintiffs' religion because "the 
high country constitutes the center of the [their] spiritual 
world" and "[n]o other geographic areas or sites hold the
q7equivalent religious significance for these tribes." The
court demonstrated sensitivity to the unique character of
American Indian religions and analogizing to Wisconsin v.
Yoder, a first amendment case decided by the Supreme Court
that involved a Christian sect, concluded:
Degradation of the high country and impairment of 
such training would carry "a very real threat of 
undermining the [tribal] communit[ieslg and 
religious practice[s] as they exist today."
Based upon the evidence that was presented at trial, the
court held that the Forest Service's plan to construct a
road into the high country and to harvest timber "would
seriously impair the salient visual, aural, and
environmental qualities of the high country" and, for that
99reason, would burden the plaintiffs' religion.
The court in Northwest Indian Çgm^tgry also carefully 
scrutinized the government's interests in the construction 
and logging and found that the construction "would not 
materially serve several of the governmental interests.
In addition, the court concluded that "even if defendants 
could [have] demonstrate[d] a compelling need for additional 
timber harvesting in the [area], means less restrictive of 
plaintiffs' First Amendment rights than the Management Plan
exist[ed] that would [have] satisf[ied] that need."^^^
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The Northwest Indian Cemetery decision demonstrates 
that the protection of the natural environment through the 
protection of a religious expression of environmental 
concern is compatible with our political institutions. 
Nevertheless, the analysis that it adopted from prior, 
similar cases does result in some limitations to a first 
amendment attack on environmental degradation. The 
claimant's interest in the environment must be religious 
rather than cultural. To protect particular sites, the 
claimants must demonstrate that the sites are central to the 
religion and indispensable. Furthermore, it seems unlikely 
that a single individual could claim to have a religious 
interest in the protection of a particular natural location 
without demonstrating that he is a member of a religious 
entity which has a long-standing tradition of holding that 
location sacred.
As the success of the claimants in the Northwest Indian 
Cemetery case demonstrates, however, such limitations can be 
overcome. If the courts carefully and sensitively will
consider the nature of the American Indian religions and
accord them the first amendment protection that they have 
been historically denied, sacred sites will receive 
protection. At the very least, government will be required 
to give due regard to the sacredness of those sites to
others in its utititarian analysis of the need for a 
particular development.
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Granted this correlation between our government's 
treatment of the environment and the American Indians, as 
well as the success of a first amendment claim to protect 
the natural environment, why is a religious expression, and 
the legal protection of this expression, an appropriate 
expression of our deepest environmental concern? The answer 
is that unlike Sagoff's and Tribe's attempts to ground the 
protection of the environment on the protection of rights, 
grounding its protection in persons' rights to the free 
exercise of their religion is not homocentric. Of course, 
both religious practices and the legal principles that 
require that they be protected are human expressions. But, 
as noted above, there is a difference between a genuinely 
human response to the experience of the inherent 
significance of nonhuman entities and a homocentric concern 
for those entities. Because the legal protection of the 
environment is an expression of a religious perception of 
the environment, rather than— as for Sagoff— an expression 
of purely human ideals, it must aknowledge the religious 
belief that the environment is inherently significant.
Likewise, the legal protection of the environment 
through the protection of persons' rights to freely exercise 
their religion better accounts for the significance of the 
environment than would according rights to nonhuman 
entities, as Tribe and Stone have proposed. By not according 
rights to nonhuman entities, we recognize the human
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character of our laws and institutions. Nevertheless, by 
protecting the environment through first amendment actions, 
we acknowledge the legal and moral significance of the
natural environment. Thus, a religious understanding of the
environment can account for both the differences between 
humans and nonhumans and the partnership between them.
Furthermore, to consider environmental concern to be a
religious practice and thus permit it to be legally
expressed in the invocation of the first amendment is not to
argue that all environmental legislation should be repealed
and that only constitutional litigation is an appropriate
way to protect the environment. Nor is it to minimize the
need for an expression of our environmental concern through
the political process. Just as the Civil Rights Act of
1Û21964 was inspired by a fresh understanding of the 
fourteenth amendment, so too the understanding of 
environmental concern to be a human right protected by the 
first amendment should spark further environmental 
legislation.
In addition to actually serving as a legal basis for 
environmental concern, the protection of the environment 
through respect for American Indian religions has 
implications for the jurisprudential and philosophical 
problems that Tribe attempts to solve. By giving American 
Indian religions due regard, we might also discover a 
satisfying account of our deepest environmental concern. In
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this regard, the synthesis between transcendence and 
immanence that Tribe seeks is expressed in the religions of 
the American. Indian.
What this synthesis really entails is the spiritual and 
philosophical reconciliation of the necessary experience of 
human alienation from the rest of the world with the equally 
necessary experience that we are interconnected with it. The 
American Indians were sensitive to both aspects of human 
existence. They recognized that their lives were utterly 
dependent on the world and honored it as their parent; and 
yet, in order to sustain themselves it was necessary that
they utilize their intimate knowledge of the ways of the
103world to slay and consume other creatures in it.
Their synthesis of both of these aspects of human
existence is reflected in the transcendence and immanence of
their deities. Black Elk has explained it in this way:
We should understand well that all things are the 
works of the Great Spirit. We should know that He 
is within all things: the trees, the grasses, the
rivers, the mountains, and the four-legged
animals, and the winged peoples; and even more
important, we should understand tÿg^'He is also 
above all these things and peoples.
The intimate relationship between persons and the
natural world is further expressed in the transcendent
character of American Indian religions. For example, even 
when an Indian attempts to become conscious of the 
transcendent spiritual world through a "vision-quest," the 
spiritual power is usually embodied in the appearance of
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105plants or animals in a vision. In turn, this ephemeral
vision is embodied in the material: in sacred bundles made
of skins and containing sacred parts of animals or plants,
or in sacred depictions of the spirit on teepees, or
articles of clothing.
The pervasive sacredness of the natural world was not
only experienced in abstract feelings or aspirations but was
usually focussed on particular animals, plants and locations
central to the subsistence of a particular t r i b e . T h e
synthesis of transcendence and immanence is expressed even
with respect to these important species and locations.
Identified with each of these natural entities is a divinity
that is embodied by the entity but not encapsulated by 
1Ü8it. Each divinity is the guardian of that entity with
109which it is identified. Since these guardians both
protect the natural entity and assist persons in hunting 
that entity, they thus express the reconciliation of human 
subsistence with the intrinsic significance of these 
nonhuman entities. In Kantian terms, they could treat 
nonhuman entities as means but not solely as means; they 
were also ends.
The American Indians' religious experience of the 
natural world thus gave rise to an ethical relationship with 
natural entities. This ethical relationship, in turn, 
assumed the character of what we might call legal 
relationships:
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In their ethical relations with persons of 
nature Indians assumed: first, that natural
entities were essentially equal in value or worth 
to humans; second, that nonhuman persons expressed 
their intentions, needs dislikes, and rights;
third, that non-humans entered covenants with 
humans for mutual benefit; there were social
contracts between humans and non-humans; and 
fourth, there was reciprocity,in these relations 
between humans and non-humans.
This ethical relationship with the natural environment was 
very significant. Their religions provided norms for 
mitigating the necessary human use of the environment. Not 
only were wasteful and disrespectful treatment of natural 
entities forbidden, even "boasting about hunting 
prowess , . . [and] denigrating comments about nature
formations, thunder, mountains, rivers and other earthly 
entities" were addressed by religious rules.
Their vision of the interconnectedness of persons and 
the natural environment was so extensive that their 
religions not only regulated disturbances and depletion of 
the environment by persons, but also required human 
participation in the regeneration of nature. For example, 
the annual Sun Dance ritual often involved the self­
infliction of suffering and personal sacrifice so that "the
112world and all beings may live, that life may be renewed."
113Furthermore, Tribe's criticism of "pagan animism" is 
not applicable to the American Indian traditions. Their ways 
of life did not "sanctify the present, with all its faults 
and i n a d e q u a c i e s . T h e y  have been remarkably adaptive and 
i n t e g r a t i v e ; i n  fact, far more so than European religions
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have been. It is true that American Indians must face the
challenge to integrate their traditions with the conditions
of modern life. The success of some to do so should be
11 fîinstructive to all.
Through their religions, the American Indians responded
to their insight into the significance of the natural
environment. It was neither a homocentric nor a misanthropic
response; rather it affirmed both the natural environment
and their own humanity. Even though most of us who are not
American Indian will not be able to adopt their heritage, a
receptivity to their experience of the world may engender in
us new ways to experience the world and inspire us to seek
the lost strands of our own traditions that have preserved
in myths and rituals a similar concern for the 
117environment. It is receptivity towards other ways of
experiencing the world— particularily as those ways are 
expressed in other religions— that has the power to change 
our own society.
As a powerful human faculty, reason must play a crucial 
role in this integration; but it is incapable of being the 
source of an environmental concern. The exercise of the 
critical powers of reason in jurisprudence and philosophy 
can serve a therapeutic function by discerning the legal and 
philosophical obstacles to our experiencing the sacredness 
of the natural environment.
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NOTES
1. Pub. L. No. 91-180, 83 Stat. 852 (42 O.S.C. §é 4321- 
4347 (1982).
2. See Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 84 
Stat. 685 (codified as amended 42 O.S.C. ââ 7401-7626 
(Supp. V 1980)). Although there had been preexisting 
legislation, the 1970 amendments represented a more 
radical commitment to the environment. See w. RODGERS 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 209 (1977). r
See Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972, 
Pub. L, No, 92-500, 86 Stat, 896 (codified as amended 
33 O.S.C. ââ 1251-1376 (1982)). These amendments
contained "bold and innovative features" and
represented a departure from past legislation. See
RODGERS, supra note 2, at 360.
3. See, e.g. Alaska Lands Act of 1980, Pub. L. No, 96-487, 
94 Stat. 2371 ( 16 O.S.C. 3101-3237 (1982)), Although 
the National Wilderness Preservation System was created 
in 1964 by the Wilderness Act of 1964, Pub, L. NO. 88- 
577, 78 Stat. 890 (16 O.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1982), very 
few areas were preserved until the 1970s. See Id. at I 
1332 (table of designated areas).
4. The Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub, L. No. 93-205, 
81 Stat. 884 (16 O.S.C. ss 1531-1543 (1982)). The Act 
was amended in 1979 to include plant species as well as 
fish and wildlife. See Act of Dec. 28, 1979, § 1, 93
Stat. 1225.
5. See, , Tobias and McLean, Of Crabbed
â M  Fxuaüratad Maodateg; ThSi Effegt 
Environmental Pfflljgy ASlS. an £jJtne.iLigXilig A.g.ençy 
Authority, 41 MONT. L. REV. 177 (1980).
6. For an analysis of the inadequacies of current laws to 
express the concern that environmentalists have and the 
negative effects of attempting to use these laws to 
give legal effect to these concerns, see A. FRAKT and 
J. RANKIN, THE LAW OF PARKS, RECREATIONAL RESOORCES, 
AND LEISORE SERVICES 79 (1982).
7. Although the classical world distinguished man from
other animals because of his reason— man as homo 
sapiens— it was not until the modern era, beginning
with Descartes' notion that mind and material things 
are different substances, that a radical dichotomy 
between persons and nonpersons resulted. For this
dichotomy's effect on the mind-body problem, see R.
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RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRRORS OP NATURE 45-61 
(1979).
What makes this dichotomy homocentric is that even 
though there is still a belief in God— e.g. Descartes 
was a devout Catholic— this new conception of the mind 
and the rest of the world transformed the modern 
conception of God, so that theology itself became 
homocentric, it made persons and their material needs 
the focal point. See J. HABERMAS, THEORY AND PRACTICE 
51 (Beacon Press ed. 1973).
8. See, e.g.. PLATO, SYMPOSIUM; ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS bk.
12; ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SOMMA THEOLOGICA I, q. 20.
9. SSS. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW passim (1924); EARLY LAW AND 
CUSTOM 26-27 (1888).
10. SS. AQUINAS, supra note 8, qq. 91-96. See also Williams,
Dedigyai and Rgnaissangg Oiigins af tha status 
thg amgfiaaa Indian In western Legal Thought, 57 s. CAL. L. REV. 1, 52-64 (1983).
11. See generally W. JONES, A HISTORY OF WESTERN
PHILOSOPHY: HOBBES TO HUME 43, 65-66, 114-115 (2d ed.
1969); J. NOSS, MAN'S RELIGIONS 669-670 (1956).
12. See JONES, supra note 11, at 179-180 (Descarte's 
philosophy expressed this view because of its radical 
dichotomy between mental and bodily substance).
13. See, e.g. J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT
See also P. SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY AND 
NARRATIVE HISTORY 26-56 (1980) (provides an overview of 
the moral philosophy that undergirded the American
Constitution).
14. Saa J. BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
Ch. 4; Saa also P. SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION: A NEW
ETHIC FOR OUR TREATMENT OF ANIMALS (1975) Our society 
has provided some protection against cruelty to 
animals. See. e.g.. the Federal Laboratory Animal 
Welfare Act 7 U.S.C. § 42(c) (1976).
15. See J. Rodman, The Liberation af Nature!, 20 Inquiry
83, 89 (1977).
16. See, e.g.. Schectman, The "Bambi Syndromefj HfiZ NE.EA.l5 
Public Participation in Wildlife Managamant ia flurting 
the Environment 8 ENVTL. L. REV. 611 (1978).
17. The way in which a utilitarian political process can
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sacrifice some persons for othersr See j. RAWLS, A 
THEORY OP JUSTICE 180 (1971), would have a greater 
effect on nonhuman entities because to satisfy their 
desires produces less utility.
18. S&S. J . LOCKE, supra note 13, ch. 5. The only way our
Constitution speaks about the rest of the world is 
property. U.S. CONST, amend. V, XIV ("life, libertyand property").
19. See C. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING: TOWARD LEGAL 
RIGHTS FOR NATURAL OBJECTS 3-10 (1974).
20. For example, the goal of NEPA is to "assure for all
Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically 
and culturally pleasing surroundings . . . [as well as
to] preserve important historic, cultural, and natural 
aspects of our national heritage . . . ." é 101(b), 42
U.S.C. é 4331(b). NEPA also recognizes "the 
responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the 
environment for succeeding generations," id.
In some states this aspiration has reached 
constitutional status. See, e.g. MONT, CONST, art. II, 
sec. 3; N.C. CONST, art. XIV, sec, 5, They have not yet 
had, however, any significant legal effect. See Tobias 
and McClean, supra note 5, at 252-262 (1981).
21. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. é 1131(a) ("to secure for the
American people of present and future generations the 
benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness .
for the use and the enjoyment of the American people 
. . ").
22. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (an act to protect
threatened species of fish, wildlife, and plants 
because "these fish, wildlife, and plants are of
esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, 
recreational and scientific value to the Nation and its 
people . . . ") .
23. See. e.g.. L. THUROW, ZERO-SUM SOCIETY: DISTRIBUTION
AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE 105 (1980)
24. M. Sagoff, On ExgagJYlng Natuxai gPglxaDgtepj;, 84 
YALE L.J. 205 (1974).
25. Id. at 255, 258. For a criticism of the historical and 
legal of Sagoff's analysis, see Tribe, From 
Environmental Faundatiana ta CQDStitatiapal Strygtuigs.? 
Learning From EtatmfiJa. JEittiixa, 84 YALE L.J. 545 (1975) .
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26. STONE, supra note 19,
27. 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974)
28. His article includes a section on what he calls, "the 
psychic and socio-psychic aspects." STONE, supra note 
19, at 42-54. He connects our current attitudes towards 
the environment to our philosophical and religious 
traditions. He fails, however, to discern the 
connection between the idea of rights and those 
traditions. Thus, he does not recognize the 
difficulties in making the leap from persons to 
nonpersons. See Rodman, supra note 26, at 15.
29. g&e Tribe, jS.upra note 25.
30. Tribe, supra note 27, at 1319.
31. liL, at 1325.
32. IAm. at 1336.
33. at 1334.
34. IjL u at 1333.
35. 1A». at 1337.
36. Id. at 1337-1338. Tribe, no doubt, is thinking of the 
way in which the Blackstonian theory of natural rights 
served to bolster the status quo, instead of 
criticizing it.
37. at 1338.
38. lA,, at 1336.
39. lA^ at 1340.
40. lA.. at 1341.
41. STONE, supra note 19, at 3-11.
42. lA^ at 17-26.
43. Id. at 26-34 (actual damages would be assessed in 
litigation; potential damage would affect human 
negotiations).
44. lA^ at 51.
45. Tribe, supra note 27, at 1346.
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46. Tribe, note 25, at 553,
47, Tribe, aupfa note 27, at 1327
48, IduL at 1317-1325,
49, Id-», at 1327,
50, at 1326,
51. at 1327.
52, lÆ»
53. IdU. at 1334.
54, Id^ at 1339,
55. Id». at 1343,
56, Id». at 1344,
57, Sês. J, MILL , UTILITARIANISMJOHN STUART MILL 211-213, 228, 259 (Robson ed. 1977)
(Because moral sentiments are mental pleasures, they 
are merely pleasures of a higher sort,),
58, Id. at 1336 ("unable with [Pascal] to embrace God"),
59, IsLu at 1337,
60, 42 J, AM, ACAD. RELIG. 614 (1974),
61, Id^ at 619,
62, IjsL. at 616.
63,
64, Id. at 619,
65, Id^
66, %d^ at 619-620,
67, Tribe, supra note 27, at 1346,
68, LOCKE, supra note 13, at sec. 61.
69, Id. at sec, 87.
70, Id. at sec. 26,
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71. I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS in
CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WRITINGS IN 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY 87 (L. Beck trans. & ed. 1949).
72. at 86.
73.
74. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY in 18 COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN
STUART MILL 225 (Robson ed. 1977).
75. at 224.
76. at 223.
77. See Rodman, supra note 15, at 95-98; Schectman, supra 
note 16; See also A. LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 
217-241 (1966).
78. Rodman, supra note 15, at 104.
79. Bugbee, supra note 60, at 620.
80. 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
81. See supra notes 1-4; See Special Message to the 
Congress on Indian Affairs, July 8, 1970, [1970] PUB. 
PAPERS 564 (Richard M. Nixon) (calling for the 
rejection of termination and paternalism); American 
Indian Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 
Stat. 469 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C S 1996 (1982)).
Concern about the environment and Indian religions 
also coalesced for a brief period of time in the 1930s. 
Under the leadership of Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
John Collier there was an attempt to reverse the prior 
policy of assimilation and to encourage the 
preservation of Indian culture and tribal entities. See 
[1934] Sec. Int. Ann. Rep, 90. In 1934 Congress passed 
the Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984
(1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. ss 461-479) 
(providing for the reestablishment of tribal entities 
and self-government). There were also corresponding 
efforts in conservation. See, e.g.. Taylor Grazing Act 
of 1934, Act of June 28, 1934, ch. 865, § 2, 48 Stat.
1269 (federal grazing lands were divided into districts 
"to preserve the land and resources from destruction 
and unnecessary injury" and funds were appropriated to 
study flood control and soil erosion in order "to 
protect and rehabilitate" these lands).
82. Quoted in A. WEINBERG, MANIFEST DESTINY 79 (1935).
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83. See, e_.g., Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 
590 (1823):
But the tribes of Indians inhabiting this 
country were fierce savages, whose occupation 
was war, and whose subsistence was drawn 
chiefly from the forest. To leave them in 
possession of their country, was to leave the 
country a wilderness.
also. C. Vechsey, Amefiaan iPdiap Environmental 
Religions. in AMERICAN INDIAN ENVIRONMENTS: ECOLOGICAL 
ISSUES IN NATIVE AMERICAN HISTORY 37 (1980) ("The
Puritans . . . believed that the Indians' religion
affirmed the satanic quality of the wilderness, just as 
the devilish quality of wilderness proved the evil of 
Indians,") .
84. See F. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICIY IN CRISIS:
CHRISTIAN REFORMERS AND THE INDIAN, 1865-1900 103-131
(1976) .
85. Id. at 94, 123. See also Vechsey, supra note 11, at 37.
86. See R. BEAVER, CHURCH, STATE AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 8 
(1966); P. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE 
FORMATIVE YEARS (1970); PRUCHA, Silfitâ note 84.
87. See PRUCHA, supra note 84, at 201-214 (the government
set up Courts of Indian offenses to try such "crimes");
Id. at 268-283 (the government used compulsory 
attendance at government and contract boarding schools 
(religious schools) to isolate the young from the 
influence of their culture). See also F. COHEN, 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 139-140 (1982 ed.).
88. See Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975). But
see New Rider v. Board of Education, 480 F.2d 693 (10th 
Cir. 1973), cert, denied. 414 U.S. 1097 (prohibiting 
Indian school boys from wearing their hair in braids 
did not violate their First Amendment rights).
89. See People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 
Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964); State v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz. 
App. 27, 504 P.2d 950 (1973), cert, denied 417 U.S. 950 
(1974). But see State v. Soto, 21 Or. App. 794, 537 
P.2d 142, cert, dsnlsd, 424 U.S. 955 (1975) (merely 
asserting that the state had a compelling interest in 
prohibiting the use of peyote as part of religious 
ceremonies).
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90. Prank v. Alaska, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979) (the 
taking of a moose out of season by a native Alaskan for 
a religious burial ceremony, though not compelled by 
his religion, was sufficiently motivated by religion to be protected).
91. See Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641, 644 (D, Utah
1977) ("The court feels that the lack of a property 
interest is determinative of the First Amendment 
question"); Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 480 
F. Supp. 608, 612 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) ("Since the
plaintiffs claim no other legal property interest in 
the land in question . . .  a free exercise claim is not 
stated here").
Badoni concerned the use of Rainbow Bridge
National Monument in southern Utah. In 1963 the Glen 
Canyon Dam was completed and the depth of the reservoir 
was gradually increased so that it covered the base of 
a large sandstone arch. This arch and other geological 
formations in the area had been holy sites to the 
Navajo people for over one hundred years, being 
regarded as the incarnation of gods. The plaintiffs 
contended that the reservoir had drowned their gods and 
that the access of boating tourists to the sites 
created by the reservoir and the National Park
Service's construction of docks and allowance of tour 
boats desecrated the sites. The Badoni court also found 
that "even if the plaintiff's claims [had been]
cognizable First Amendment claims . . . the interests
of the defendant would [have] clearly outweigh[ed] the 
interests of plaintiffs." Badoni « 455 F. Supp. at 645.
The suit in Sequoyah was brought by three Cherokee 
individuals (including a medicine-man, Ammoneta
Sequoyah) and two Cherokee tribal organizations to 
enjoin the the closing of the floodgates of the Tellico 
Dam in Tennessee. Closing the floodgates would have 
created a reservoir in the valley behind the dam. The 
plaintiffs contended that the flooding of the valley 
would cover burial and other sacred sites and would
destroy the source of Sequoyah's medicine, all of which 
would result in a significant loss of spiritual power
to the Cherokees.
92. Sequoyah v. Tennesse Valley Authority, 620 F.2d 1159, 
1164 (6th Cir. 1980); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 P.2d 
172, 176 (10th Cir. 1980).
93. SeauovaJi 620 F.2d at 1164-1165.
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94. Sêê îâ^ at 1164; Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735,
744 (D.C. Cir. 1983):
plaintiffs seeking to restrict government 
land use in the name of religious freedom 
must, at a minimum, demonstrate that the 
government's proposed land use would impair a 
religious practice that could not be 
performed at any other site.
Though acknowledging that "[bjecause the 
plaintiffs' religions are . . . site specific,
development of the Peaks would severely impair the 
practice of the religions if it destroyed the natural 
conditions necessary for the performance of ceremonies 
and the collection of religious objects," Id. at
742, the Wilson court did not find the plaintiffs' 
claim that "the expansion of the ski area will destroy 
the natural conditions necessary for prayers and 
ceremonies to be effective; and that the mountain as a 
whole, and not just parts thereof, is considered 
sacred" to be dispositive, since "evidence that all of 
San Francisco Peaks, including Snow Bowl, is sacred 
does not establish the indispensibility of the permit 
area." Id. at 745 n.7. For this reason the circuit 
court upheld the district court's affirmance of Forest 
Service decision to permit private parties to expand 
and develop a ski area in a national forest in Arizona.
But see Pepper, The Conundrum af Üia Free Exercise 
glaaag-zgamg Bsflagtlpas or EsRsnt. Qâs&s., 9 n. kent. l. 
REV. 265, 284-285 (1982; Stambor, Manifest Destiny and 
American Indian Religious gJsedaiDâ. BâdfiPi and
the Drowned Gods, 10 AM. IND. L. REV. 59, 67 (1983)
(though other courts had mentioned the centrality of a 
particular practice to the plaintiff's religion, they 
had not employed it as an analytical standard).
95. See Badoni 638 F.2d at 179; Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. 
Supp. 785, 794 (D. S.D. 1982). ÊUt Sêe Wilson 708 F.2d 
at 747 ("where governmental action violates the Free 
Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause ordinarily 
does not bar judicial relief").
96. 565 F. Supp. at 591.
97. at 594.
98. Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218
(1971)).
99. Id. at 594-595.
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100. Id_. at 595-596 (Timber could be harvested without the
proposed road section, there would be no net increase
in jobs, and potential recreational use through greater 
access would be offset by diminished use of the area for its primitive qualities) ,
101. IsL.. at 596.
102. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 242-268 (1964).
103. See Vechsey, supra note 83, at 12-13.
104. quoted in, J. BROWN, THE SPIRITUAL LEGACY OP THE
AMERICAN INDIAN 81 (1982) .
105. Isi^ at 79-80.
106. IdjL
107. See A. HULTKRANTZ, BELIEF AND WORSHIP IN NATIVE NORTH 
AMERICA 123 (1981).
108. SêÊ at 138-146.
109. Idj.; Cf. STONE, siipxa. note 19 (suggesting that humans 
be appointed as guardians for natural objects).
110. Vechsey, supra note 83, at 20.
111. liLi. at 21
112. BROWN, supxa note 104, at 103.
113. Tribe, supra note 27, at 1337.
114.
115. 56A HULTKRANTZ, supra note 107, at 131.
116. In the field of law, for example, tribal courts are 
attempting to use both Anglo-American legal precedent 
and tribal custom to adjudicate cases.
117. For an example of an attempt to recapture certain 
strands of Christianity that involve an environmental 
concern, see W. GRANBERG-MICHAELSON, A WORLDLY 
SPIRITUALITY: THE CALL TO TAKE CARE OF THE EARTH 
(1984). Martin Heidegger has also described a 
relationship between persons and things that is similar 
to the American Indians' relationship. M. HEIDEGGER, 
The Thing in POETRY, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT (1971).
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PERSONS, POLITICS AND REASON IN 
RAWLS AND PLATO:
A COMPARISON OP LIBERAL AND CLASSICAL WORLD-VIEWS
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For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by
a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how
to choose them, which assuredly I do not. If they 
were in charge, I should miss the stimulus of 
living in a society where I have, at least 
theoretically, some part in the direction of 
public affairs. Of course I know how illusory 
would be the belief that my vote determined 
anything; but nevertheless when I go to the polls 
I have the satisfaction in the sense that we are 
all engaged in a common venture.
Learned Hand^
Learned Hand has not been the only jurist or
commentator to speak disparagingly about Plato's political 
2theory. Such remarks about Plato are usually made in the
context of a discussion of the American legal tradition of
judicial review. In this context, allusions to Plato's 
guardians typify an extreme form of the doctrine of judicial 
review where judges would have a free hand in "trumping" the 
will of the majority^ whenever that will violates some 
higher law discoverable by judges. Thus, Plato's political 
theory is perceived to be radically antidemocratic and 
epistemologically naive.
More generally, the central features of Plato's 
political theory bespeak what has been called the 
"classical" world-view. For the last five hundred years, 
however, western culture has expressed what has been called 
a "modern" world-view, characterized by the political 
philosophy, "liberalism." Like all generalizations, at some 
point the attempt both to classify a variety of perspectives 
in a single category and to make sharp distinctions between
1
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the world-views of two periods breaks down. Nevertheless, 
this attempt can be meaningful.
It can be meaningful in the following way. Although 
much of the time we simply conceive the world and our place
in it as it has been passed on to us and is being propagated
by our culture, sometimes we ask ourselves, "Why is our
world understood in this way and not some other way?" We
also may have experiences that are not explained or given
satisfactory expression by our culture. So, we turn to the
culture of another time or place.
To be sure, any attempt to escape our culture is 
fatally flawed. First, the inextricable relationship between 
even our most mundane ways of life and our loftiest cultural
expressions does not permit us to graft a different
intellectual world-view onto our current mundane course of 
life; at some point we must actually change our course of 
life. Second, at least where the different world-view or 
culture preceded ours, the reason ours is different is that 
the old one could not account for the experiences of our 
more recent ancestors.
Despite this futility of seeking a Golden Age, 
reflection on crucial differences between our world-view and 
the preceding one can be helpful. It can provide the 
perspective for understanding, as best we are able, the ways 
in which our world-view both expresses some of our deepest 
insights into our human experiences better than the
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classical world-view and stifles others that were given 
expression in the classical world-view.
To this end, Plato's notion of justice, as
representative of the classical world-view, will be compared 
with one that presents, I believe, the best contemporary 
expression of liberal political theory, John Rawls' A Theory
4ûi Justice. It will be argued that these two theories of
justice rest on fundamentally different answers to two
important questions about what it means to be human. The 
first question asks what is the inherent relationship
between persons. And the second asks about the nature of 
human reason and knowledge.
Theories q£ Justice
Rawls states the general conception of his theory of
justice to be: "All social primary goods— liberty and
opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-
respect— are to be distributed equally unless an unequal
distribution of any or all of these goods is to the
5advantage of the least favored," This general conception is 
further articulated as two principles of justice and two 
priority rules for their application. The principles are:
First: each person is to have an equal right
to the most extensive basic liberty compatible 
with a similar liberty for others.
Second: social and economic inequalities are
to be arranged so that they are both (a) 
reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, 
and Xb) attached to positions and offices open to 
all.
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The first priority rule is that the two principles of
justice must be lexically ordered; the operation of the 
second principle must be consistent with the full operation
7of the first. In other words, liberty cannot be sacrificed 
to increase social and economic goods or equality. The
second priority rule requires that the first part of the 
second principle— the difference principle— be subordinated
Dto a requirement that there be fair opportunity. The rest 
of Rawls' book, A Theory af Justice, further clarifies these 
principles, argues that they are superior to three 
alternatives— utilitarianism, intuitionism, and perfec­
tionism— and suggests how these principles would be embodied 
in social and political institutions.
Plato's statement of what justice is is even more
9pithy; it is the "principle of doing one's own business." 
Thus, for Plato, justice is a harmony both in the
functioning of the various parts, or organs, within
individual persons and in the roles of persons within 
states. This principle of justice is broad enough even to 
comprehend a harmony within, the entire universe which is a 
"visible animal containing the visible— the sensible god who 
is the image of the intellectual, the greatest, best, 
fairest, most perfect— the one only-begotten heaven.
Plato's conception of justice is thus best analogized 
to the life of a healthy organism or entire ecosystem where 
each organ or organism both contributes by and benefits from
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carrying out its purpose within the whole according to its 
nature. Injustice, or disharmony, results from the failure 
of an organ or organism to do its part or from its attempt 
to perform the task of another.
Even from such a brief exposition of these two 
conceptions of justice, it is clear that they are 
significantly dissimilar. Rawls' theory emphasizes liberty 
and equality of persons in the state; Plato's suggests that 
what is important is the fulfillment of the innate functions 
and capabilities of each person and the harmony between 
persons and the overall health of the state that this will 
produce. Rawls' theory thus requires the state to maintain 
strict neutrality concerning persons' ends (so long as they 
are consistent with the principles of justice). Plato's 
theory, on the other hand, requires both that the persons of 
the state at least share the conviction that there are 
appropriate ends for each person and that the state, and 
each person in it, actively endeavor to discover and nurture 
them. Both of these differences result from the 
fundamentally different assumptions that Rawls and Plato 
make about the inherent relationship between persons and the 
nature of human reason.
Iha Inherent Relationship BPtvegp Persons
Liberal political theories, with the exception of 
utilitarianism, have a "contractarian" conception of the 
state where persons as autonomous individuals come together
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and form a state in order to improve their individual lives.
A contractarian understanding of society is a feature of
liberals like Hobbes, Locke, and Kant. In conceiving the
individual to be prior to the state, these contractarian
theories emphasize that persons are inherently significant
as individuals. Therefore, as Kant states, "man . . . exists
as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrari-
12ly used . . . ." Of course, this recognition can, and did, 
result in liberal conceptions of the state with different
moral and political emphases. Compare, for example, the
13positivism of Hobbes to Kant's notion of duty.
Rawls' theory of justice carries on the legacy of the 
contractarian tradition. It reflects the optimism of Kant,
rather than the pessimism of Hobbes, but dispenses with
14Kant’s metaphysical foundation for his ethic. Like other
liberals, Rawls conceives a person to be fundamentally "a
15free and equal rational being." Thus, for purposes of 
deriving principles of justice in a society, he turns to a 
hypothetical coming together of persons, which he calls the 
"original position." The significantly liberal conception of 
the relationship between persons is preserved in Rawls' 
description of this original position and thus in his 
principles of justice. In this original position, persons 
are "mutually disinterested," i.e. "conceived as not taking 
an interest in one another's interests. But unlike, for 
example, Hobbes' perception of persons in the state of
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nature, the parties of Rawls' original position are not 
egoists.
That the parties are mutually disinterested, however,
implies that purpose of the state is solely the betterment
of individual interests. Rawls even states that both the
need for a state and for one that is just follows from the
empirical fact that "everyone's well-being depends upon a
scheme of cooperation without which no one could have a
satisfactory life."^^
Thus, Rawls, like all liberals, is primarily concerned
about the significance of individual persons. This concern
is expressed by conceiving of persons as autonomous. Because
he is so protective of individual autonomy, Rawls, like all
deontological liberals, conceives of individual persons as
having a moral priority. This priority is evidenced most
strongly in his criticism of utilitarianism.
Rawls primary criticism of utilitarianism is that it
18"does not take seriously the distinction between persons."
At the personal level, it affirms the liberal notion that
"[a] person quite properly acts, at least when others are
not affected, to achieve his own greatest good, to advance
19his rational ends as far as possible." Likewise, the 
utilitarian must take into account the happiness of every 
person. Thus, utilitarianism is a liberal theory. Where 
utilitarianism goes astray, according to Rawls, is that 
"It]he principle for choice for an association of men is
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interpreted as an extension of the principle of choice for 
one man.
This extension, however, is not based on a classical-
like understanding that persons in the state are inherently
interconnected. Instead, it results from the pragmatic
character of utilitarianism. Utilitarians simply claim that
since we are already in a society, we must consider the good
of society as a whole. Since they do not believe that there
21are inherent individual rights, they need not, like the
deontologicals, imagine a pre-societal state of nature to
explain and justify such rights. Utilitarians do refer to
the empirically based principle of diminishing marginal
utility, that they believe will assure the liberal ideal of
equality. This principle states that the amount of utility
that would be generated through the monopolization of goods
and privileges by some persons and the consequential
deprivation of others would be increasingly less and the
22disutility would be increasingly greater. Likewise, Mill
in his essay, Qa Liberty, argues that the soundest rationale
23for individual liberty is utilitarianism. Thus,
utilitarians claim that there would be liberty and equality 
in a utilitarian state, Rawls, however, is not satisfied 
with the empirical character of the utilitarians' principle 
of diminishing marginal utility and the assumptions about 
persons that Mill makes in his argument for a utilitarian 
conception of l i b erty,Rawls,  like prior contractarians.
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attempts to improve upon utilitarianism by conceiving of
persons as radically distinct.
It is important to note, however, that Rawls believes
that his theory of justice ultimately leads to an experience
of a political relationship between persons far richer than
this description of the persons in the original position— an
aggregate of mutually disinterested individuals. For Rawls,
this conception of persons in the original position is
necessary to formulate principles that will ensure liberty
and equality. The third liberal ideal, fraternity or social
union, he argues, will naturally arise once the structure of
our social institutions embody his principles of justice,
even though these principles are derived from a conception
of the mutual disinterestedness of individuals. The result
would be that:
Ethical norms are no longer experienced merely as 
constraints, but are tied together into one 
coherent conception. The connection between these 
standards and human aspirations is now 
comprehended, and persons understand their sense 
of justice as an extension of their natural 
attachments, andg as a way of caring about the 
collective good.
Nevertheless, because Rawls' makes his argument that social
union will occur on the basis of a particular psychological
26theory of moral learning, the objections that he raises 
against the utilitarian's invocation of the principle of 
diminishing marginal utility may be raised against this 
feature of his theory.
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Rawls criticizes the utilitarian's attempt to account
for liberty and equality by joining to the theory of
utilitarianism the empirical principle of diminishing
27marginal utility. He claims that the equality and liberty
of persons is so important that it should not be left to
28"arguments from general facts." Rather, they should be
nembed[ded] . . . more directly into [the theory's] first
principles.
As we have seen, Rawls' accounts for fraternity by
appealing to an empirical principle— a theory of moral 
learning. He thinks that it is important but fails to build 
into his theory of justice a sense of community, or what he 
calls "social union." Not only does he not pursue this ideal 
in the formulation of his principles of justice, but the 
original position, the condition for the formulation of his 
principles, explicitly requires that a sense of the
interconnectedness of persons be suspended. His conception
of primary goods, then, cannot include community as a
, 30 good.
Thus, the question that he poses to utilitarians can be 
raised concerning his own theory of justice: if fraternity
is important, it should be embedded into the theory's first
principles. To be sure, he intentionally excludes community 
in order to argue "from widely accepted but weak 
p r e m i s e s . B u t  can a rich conclusion like a conception of 
the state as a community result from such weak premises?
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What reflection on the classical conception of the
relationship between persons reveals, however, is that
Rawls' premises are weak and widely accepted because they
are fundamental principles of the liberal world-view that is
predominant in our culture. Even the theory of moral
learning that Rawls invokes to show how social union can
32come about reflects this liberal world-view.
Ironically, the crucial problem for the implementation
of Rawls' theory of justice is that the mutual
disinterestedness that characterizes the persons in his
original position is morally acceptable in our society.
Unlike the persons in the original position, however, we are
not under a veil of ignorance. Thus, our mutual
disinterestedness would lead us to reject the implementation
of Rawls' theory because, for most of us, it would lead to a
decrease in primary goods. It would seem, then, that Rawls
must appeal either to an inherent sentiment for justice or
to a concept of ourselves as inherently concerned about each
other in order to convince us to adopt his theory.
Plato appeals to both. Like utilitarians, Plato
assumes that the state is analogous to a single person. This
assumption enables Socrates in the Republic to reflect on
the nature of justice at the level of what we might call
personal morality by considering what might constitute
33justice within a state. Likewise, it enables Socrates to 
use analyses of the experience of justice at the personal
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level to consider how a state could be just. This analogy 
between the person and the state is so strict that the very 
structure of state is analogized to Plato's conception of 
the structure of the human soul.
The basis for the analogy is that, as Socrates points 
out in the Crito. the state is like a parent to persons. 
Like family, the state is both conceptually and factually 
prior to individuals, being the very condition for their 
birth and growth to maturity. Thus, in stark contrast to 
liberalism, persons cannot be conceived as stateless 
individuals who contract with each other to form a state. 
The state is the very condition for the complete 
development— moral as well as physical— of the person.
Because of this relationship between persons and state,
politics and ethics are interconnected. Citizens take an
active interest in making the state virtuous and the state,
in turn, actively seeks to instill virtue within each of its
citizens. Ideally, for Plato, the state would be 
36classless. There would be no need for a paternalistic 
ruler if the citizens were fully mature persons, i.e., 
rational and self-controlled. The active pursuit of virtue 
by each of its citizens not only would be in harmony with, 
but also would aid, the similar pursuit by everyone else.
Even when Plato considers what he calls the "feverish 
s t a t e , w h e r e  the state has three different classes of 
persons corresponding to different levels of human maturity.
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the state is conceived of as an organic unity. First, 
despite the disparity in human maturity, the contribution of 
each person is necessary and significant: "each man must
perform social service in the state for which his nature was 
best adapted."^®
Second, by participating in a state, each person can
attain a vicarious human perfection insofar as the state is
made more perfect through the contributions of each. Thus,
the full development of each person's capacities is
consistent with and necessary for the full development of
the capacities of the state. As Socrates states in the
Republic: "[T]he object on which we fixed our eyes in the
establishment of our state was not the exceptional happiness
of any one class but the greatest possible happiness of the
39city as a whole."
It is clear, then, that the classical world-view, as 
exemplified in Plato's political theory, can account for an 
experience of our social relationships with each other as 
fundamentally given and not subservient to individual self- 
interest. By believing that a person's good consists in the 
pursuit of human virtue and that the state is both an 
expression of that virtue and a necessary condition for 
attaining it, the classical conception could reconcile the 
liberal conflict between the interests of individuals and 
the state. Thus, under Plato's conception of the state, even 
the person having what we could consider the lowliest role
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in a society would experience to a greater degree "the sense
that we are all engaged in a common venture"^^ than he could
in our current system or even in Rawls' idealization of it.
Nevertheless, the interconnectedness emphasized in
Plato's conception of the state seems to challenge our
notions of equality and liberty. As is evident in Rawls'
theory, the creation of a conceptual framework sufficient to
account for our notions of equality and liberty results in
conceiving of persons in a state as fundamentally unrelated.
Conversely, a conception of persons as interconnected
implies a conception of the state that is hierarchical and
paternalistic.
The conflicts between liberty and paternalism and
between equality and hierarchy raise a formidable obstacle
to an attempt to combine intelligibly the moral insight of
liberalism that each person has intrinsic dignity, which
41ought to receive "equal concern and respect," with the 
classical world's aspiration for political unity that is 
capable of nurturing the individual. Is there a way to 
combine both of these insights? To answer this, we must 
first examine Rawls' and Plato's conceptions of reason. It 
is their conceptions of reason that lead to Rawls’ quest for 
equality and liberty and Plato's acceptance of hierarchy and 
paternalism.
The Nature of. mrnan figasaa a M  ^npylgdge 
That persons possess the power of reason has been
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important to the liberal conception of liberty and equality. 
For example, in his Sgggod Tfgatigg 01 Government. John
Locke states that we "are born free as we are born
r a t i o n a l . I t  is our reason that in our moral theories, 
radically distinguishes us from other things. Likewise, for 
Kant, it is our reason that provides us with "autonomy"
which "is the basis of dignity of human and of every 
rational nature.
It is understandable, then, that as in their 
conceptions of the relationship between persons, classical 
and liberal world-views differ in their conceptions of human 
reason and knowledge. This difference is insightfully 
examined by Roberto Mangabeira Onger in his book. Knowledge 
and Politics.
According to Unger, whereas there are not problematic
dichotomies between theory and fact and between reason and
desire in classical thought, in the liberal conception of
the person— what Unger calls liberal psychology— there are
twin antinomies: theory and fact, and reason and desire. The
antinomy of theory and fact arises from modern philosophy's
rejection of "intelligible essences." Liberal thought
"denies the existence of a chain of essences or 
essential qualities that we could either infer 
from particular things in the world or perceive 
face to face in their abstract forms. And it 
therefore insists that there are numberless ways 
in which object and events in the world might be 
classified.We cannot decide in the abstract whether a 
given classification is justified. The only
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standard is whether the classification serves the 
par^^cular purpose we had in mind when we made
This dichotomy between theory and fact results in a
correponding problem with the way liberalism understands
reason and desire. If theory is evaluated solely on its
success in serving our purposes, where do we get purposes
and how can they be evaluated. This is what Unger calls the
antinomy of reason and desire. The first factor contributing
to this problematic chasm between reason and desire is the
liberal conception of the mind as a kind of machine. It has
only two operations: "analysis and combination."^^ The
result of this conception of a passive mind is that it
requires some entity to move it. This entity is desire.
Thus, "[t]he mind machine, by itself, wants nothing; desire,
47unaided by understanding, can see nothing."
The essential character of the liberal conception of
desires, according to Unger, is that they are arbitrary.
They are arbitrary because of "the impossibility of using
48reason to justify their content." The arbitrariness of
desire makes ends solely a matter of the exercise of the
will. "Understanding contributes to the organization of our
goals by clarifying their interrelations, but it never
49ultimately determines their substance." Thus, the antinomy 
of theory and fact parallels the antinomy of reason and 
desire: "Reason is as formal in the performance of its moral 
responsibilities as it is in the development of scientific
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truth.
Jurgen Habermas, in his book Theory and Practice, also 
notes a difference in the classical and modern notions of 
reason and examines it in the context of what he calls "the 
transformation of classical politics into modern social 
p h i l o s o p h y . H i s  analysis of this transformation shows how 
the liberal notion of reason is intimately related to how 
liberals conceive the inherent relationship of persons in a 
state.
As discussed in the preceding section, classical
politics conceived persons as inherently citizens of a
state. There is, as Habermas notes, a corresponding
52"interconnectedness of Ethics and Politics." This unity
is founded on a particular theory of knowledge and "an
53ontology of human nature."
In liberalism, ethics and politics are separated 
because of its conception of reason and knowledge. 
Liberalism adheres to "the ideal of knowledge originating in 
Hobbes' time, the ideal of the new science, which implies 
that we only know an object to the extent that we ourselves 
can produce it."^^ Thus, knowledge can only be evaluated by 
reference to human desire. If human desires are arbitrary, 
we can share only the most basic desires. Thus, whereas 
"the theoretically based point of departure for the Ancients 
was how human beings could comply practically with the 
natural order, . . . the practically assigned point of
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departure of the Moderns is how human beings could 
technically master the threatening evils of nature. 
Ethics, which addresses the most controversial desires,
must, therefore, be severed from politics.
Of these threatening evils of nature, the foremost 
threat has been perceived to be other persons.
Consequently, the notion of knowledge as manipulation of 
nature transforms classical politics into a political
technology aimed at providing security and order. Thus, "the 
question of the 'wherefore' and 'to what end?' of human 
social life, . . . now yields to another question: how and
by what means can the civitas be ordered and made
tractable?"^^
Because Rawls* theory shares these liberal premises, it 
is equally subject to their problems. These problems first 
arise in his notion of moral theory and fact. For Rawls, 
moral theory must begin with a careful examination of fact: 
the formulation of principles is "an attempt to describe our
C Osense of justice." Of the everyday judgments we make about 
the justice or injustice of actions or states of affairs, 
however, only considered judgments, that is, "those 
judgments in which our moral capacities are most likely to 
be displayed without distortion," can be the basis for the 
formulation of moral p r i n c i p l e s T h u s ,  moral theory is "a 
formulation of a set of principles which, when conjoined to 
our beliefs and knowledge of the circumstances, would lead
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us to make these judgments with their supporting reasons 
were we to apply these principles conscientiously and 
intelligently,
Rawlsr then has a two-part criterion for a good moral
theory. First, it must "give a better match with our
considered judgments on reflection than , . . Iits]
61alternatives." Second, "as a whole [it must seem] on 
reflection to clarify and to order our thoughts, and if it 
tends to reduce disagreements and to bring divergent
convictions more in line, then it has done all that one may
g oreasonably ask." Thus, Rawls' notion of theory is marked
by the analytical passivity described by Unger,
On the other hand, Rawls suggests that a theory, once
formulated, might exercise a regulative function, that is,
"we may want to change our present considered judgments once
63their regulative principles are brought to light." Because 
of the otherwise passive role that, for Rawls, theory plays, 
this suggestion raises the antinomy of theory and fact. 
First, if our moral capacities are consistent and
intelligible, as Rawls seems to assume, it would seem that 
restricting our data pool of actual judgments only to 
considered judgments would lead us to a single theory that 
adequately describe all of these judgments. Second, assuming 
that for some reason one or several of our considered 
judgments do not fit a particular theory, what criterion 
would we use to decide whether to select a different theory
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or to change those considered judgments? Without appealing
to something like essences, the possible criteria seem to be
either that the clearest and most strongly held considered
judgments would control which theory we adopted, or that the
theory describing the greatest number of considered
judgments would control. Unfortunately, Rawls is silent
about such criteria.
Likewise, Rawls' theory incorporates the dichotomy
between reason and desire. Rawls makes the traditional
liberal assumption, albeit with some empirical evidence to
support it, that the normal state of affairs in a state is
that while persons
have roughly similar needs and interests, or needs 
and interests in various ways complementary, so 
that mutually advantageous cooperation among them 
is possible, they nevertheless have their own 
plans of life. These plans, or conceptions of the 
good, lead them to have different ends and 
purposes, and to make conflicting claj^s on the 
natural and social resources available.
Thus, while Rawls does not affirmatively deny the
possibility of a shared conception of the good within a
state, he assumes for the purpose of formulating the
principles of justice that persons may have whatever
conception of the good they desire. Further, this state of
affairs is perfectly legitimate even after the principles
have been derived and embodied in the state's institutions,
so long as a person's conception of the good is consistent
with the principles of justice. It is this emphasis on
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individual desires that makes it necessary for Rawls' to
come up with primary goods, those things that everyone would
want, whatever else they might want,^^
After deriving the principles of justice from
conditions that include this "thin" theory of the good,
however, Rawls does attempt to articulate a thicker theory
of the good that includes a universally human "motivational 
66principle," This principle, which Rawls calls the 
Aristotelian Principle, is that "other things equal, human 
beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities 
(their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment 
increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater 
its complexity,"®^
The Aristotelian Principle enables Rawls to evaluate 
with a single principle all human activities and thereby 
avoid a cultural nihilism. Although this principle 
represents a step toward the classical conception of the 
good, it still embodies a dichotomy between reason and 
desire, Dnlike the role of reason in the classical world­
view, reason, for Rawls, cannot assist us in determining 
what our capacities are and how these capacities ought to be 
fitted into the state: "By itself the principle simply
asserts a propensity to ascend whatever chains are chosen. 
It does not entail that a rational plan includes and 
particular aims, nor does it imply any special form of 
society."®® why, then, do persons choose one rational plan
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and not another? According to this view, they choose one
simply because they desire it. But both of the alternative
accounts for this desire— random choice or a genetically and
environmentally determined choice— undercut the liberal
ideal of autonomy.
This liberal conception of rationality is significant
to Rawls' formulation of his principles of justice, Rawls
assumes that persons in the original position are rational.
Rationality, however, "must be interpreted as far as
possible in the narrow sense, standard in economic theory,
of taking the most effective means to given ends,"^^ Thus,
his notion of human reason, at least for purposes of
formulating a theory of justice, is reduced to an
instrumental function. It assumes that a person has given
preferences and that reason itself cannot generate or
discover them. We simply find ourselves with desires and "a
rational person . . . follows the plan which will satisfy
more of his desires rather than less, and which has the
70greater chance of being successfully executed." Thus,
rationality is reduced to a quantitative evaluation: the
greater and the more probable are the more rational.
Even Rawls' attempt to go beyond "the simpler
71principles of rational choice (the counting principles)" 
by articulating a notion of "deliberative rationality" which 
could order life plans has this flaw. Deliberative 
rationality would lead us to choose a plan that
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would be decided upon as the outcome of careful 
reflection in which the agent reviewed, in the 
light of all the relevant facts, what it would be 
like to carry out these plans and thereby 
ascertain the course of action that -would best 
realize his more fundamental desires.
Once again, reason can only measure our desires, not the
objects of our desire.
As both Unger and Habermas suggest, the classical
world-view includes a far richer, though also problematic,
73conception of reason and knowledge. First, because it 
assumes that there are essences, theories not only are able 
to classify facts, but insofar as theory is able to 
comprehend more of the essential nature of things it can 
also evaluate facts* Further, because the criterion of truth 
is how closely the theory corresponds to the nature of the 
thing rather than the purpose of the theoretician, reason is 
not reduced to the power to determine efficient methods to 
pursue nonrational desires.
Consequently, the use of knowledge in human activity 
does not have the manipulative character of its liberal 
counterpart, technology. The classical world-view conceived 
of human activity as tecime, or in the context of ethical 
and political activities, as practical reason. Thus, reason 
is able both to discern the good of each thing and to 
determine how to nurture that thing into attaining its good. 
Thus, the crucial character of the classical conception of 
practical reason, as Habermas points out, is that "[f]or the
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Ancients the capacity of goal-directed activity, skill,
^gghng r was knowledge that always pointed toward theory as
the supreme aim and the highest goal, just as was the
prudence of reasonable action, ohronesis . . . Second,
there is no inherent dichotomy between reason and desire in
the classical world-view. Each thing, in fact, desires to
attain its good that reason seeks to comprehend.
It is Aristotle, rather than Plato, who carefully
distinguishes practical reason from theoretical reason and
recognizes the importance that the former has in political
75and ethical theory. Nevertheless, Plato's conception of
reason includes both types, treating them as different
facets of one and the same reason. Likewise, although it is
Aristotle who articulates the classical synthesis of reason
76and desire in his notion of final causation, such a
synthesis is implicit in Plato's conception of the world.
Although we generally think of Plato either as a
mathematician or as a mystic, the very method of discourse
in his dialogues seeks truth by a careful examination of
persons' experience of the world. To be sure, his dialectic
77focusses on the clarification of concepts, but the
concepts themselves are drawn from a careful observation of
a variety of human and natural activities. As Alcibiades
says of Socrates in the Symposium;
Anyone listening to Socrates for the first time 
would find his arguments simply laughable; he 
wraps them up in just the kind of expressions
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you'd expect of such an insufferable satyr. He 
talks about pack asses and blacksmiths and 
shoemakers and tanners, and he always seems to be 
saying ^ge same old thing in just the same old way
e # * #
This is particularily true when Socrates considers the
nature of virtue and the art of legislation, where he uses
numerous analogies to the activities of doctors and ship 
79captains.
Likewise, Plato has a notion of reason that includes
the artful or nurturing capacity of practical reason. The
best example of his recognition of the importance of
practical reason is in his description of the ideal leader
of the state:
The political ideal is not full authority for laws 
but rather full authority for a man who 
understands the art of kinship and has kingly 
ability. . . .
Law can never issue an injunction binding on 
all which really embodies what is best for each; 
it cannot prescribe with perfect accuracy what is 
good and right«for each member of the community at 
any one time.
Thus, the kingly art does not consist simply in knowledge of
the good for persons but requires knowledge about the
particular participants in the state and how to nurture them
toward a particular expression of the good for persons. Of
course, Plato realizes that this political ideal is
81impossible to actualize. Nevertheless, it is the same 
practical or artful character of reason that enables the 
legislator to do the next best thing by designing "the law 
for the generality of his subjects under average
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circumstances,"®^
Similarly, Plato has a conception of desire that does
not conflict with his notion of reason. Unlike the liberal
conception of reason and desire, where what a person desires
is good simply because he desires it, for Plato, a person's
83deepest desire is for the Good. Since everyone desires the
good, there is nothing inherently wrong with our desires.
Nevertheless, desire in and of itself is not sufficient to
enable us to attain our good; both theoretical and practical
knowledge is needed to guide our desire to its ultimate
goal. Thus, it is our ignorance, resulting in a misdirected
84desire, that accounts for our evils.
85Socrates, in his speech in the Symposium, points out
this relationship between reason and desire. He describes
how this intrinsically good desire for beauty and happiness
must be tutored so that it ascends from that which is less
beautiful to that which is more beautiful and finally to
beauty itself. Thus, reason is not the slave of the
passions,®® nor vice-versa; rather, there is a partnership
between desire and reason.
Of course, Plato's theoretical premise for his
conception of the coherency of theory and fact and of reason
and desire rests on his conviction that there are Forms,
87including the Good, in which the world participates.
88 89Further, the allegory of the cave, the tale of Er, and
90his notion of knowledge as remembrance suggest that at
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least in principle these Forms, especially the Good, can be 
comprehended through human reason. It is this belief in the 
existence of a comprehensible Good that we moderns, 
including Unger and Habermas,®^ find most revolting. 
Spectres of facism, fanatacism, ideologues, etc, swiftly 
come to mind when we think of this aspect of Plato's 
philosophy.
What is ironic about our reaction, however, is that it 
is these sorts of dogmatic persons who, in Plato's
Q ndialogues, are most perturbed with Socrates inquiries.
Thus, the Socratic dialogues demonstrate the critical
function of philosophy. Granted that Plato seems to have had
a stronger conviction than the historical Socrates that the
Forms could be comprehended and that he had developed a
powerful enough philosophical method to comprehend them, it
does not obviate that the basis of Socrates' quest for the
examined life was in his conviction, like Plato's, that
there is a Good, All of the Socratic dialogues evidence a
concern for the moral and social havoc in Athens during the
Peloponnesian War, described by the historian, Thucydides,
93as a time when "words changed their meaning,"
This critical function of philosophy is even invoked by
Rawls, In discussing the possibility that theory may cause
us to change some of our considered judgments, Rawls
94suggests that "[m]oral philosophy is Socratic," But
without a belief in the existence of a Good, how can Rawls'
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moral philosophy be evaluative? Without such a conviction,
Rawls is left with the liberal conception of the examined
life: the clarification of what our desires are and of what
is the most efficient means to attain them. Any conception
of the examined life, other than this liberal conception, 
however, would question the rationality of our fundamental 
desires. Such criticism of the moral neutrality of our 
desires would pose a threat to the liberal notion of
equality and liberty. For if the desires of some are not as 
rational as the desires of others, the former, like minors 
and persons found mentally incompetent in our society, would 
be subject to greater supervision by the state.
To be sure, the pursuit of liberty and equality
produces a pluralism that can provide us with the
opportunity to compare our desires and assessments of the 
most rational means with the desires and assessments of 
others. In this exposure to diversity, as Mill persuasively 
a r g u e s , s o c i e t y  as a whole and each member of it are in 
some way enriched. But it seems that mere exposure to 
diversity, without the belief that there is a better, more 
virtuous, or more appropriately human way for a person to 
live, cannot tell us why we should appreciate or integrate 
into our own life the different desires or life plans of 
another. Instead, diversity seems to result in self- 
complacency or in a smorgasbord approach to self-improvement 
rather than in a genuine receptivity that is both critical
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and nurturing.
^onsluding
Phaedrus: . • • How far superior to the other 
sort is the recreation that a man finds in words, 
when he discourses about justice and the other 
topics you speak of.
Socrates: Yes indeed, dear Phaedrus, But far
more excellent, I think, is the serious treatment 
of them, which employs the art of dialectic. The 
dialectician selects a soul of the right type, and 
in it he plants and sows his words founded on 
knowledge, words which can defend both themselves 
and him who planted them, words which instead of 
remaining barren contain a seed whence new words 
grow up in new characters, whereby the seed is 
vouchsafed immortality, and its possessor the 
fullest measure of blessedness that man can attain unto,^®
This passage from the Phaedrus illustrates the way in which 
Plato’s conception of the inherent interconnectedness of 
persons dovetails with his belief in the evaluative function 
of reason. It expresses a mutual commitment by the citizens 
of state to discourse concerning the good, secured by the 
conviction, which liberalism lacks, that there is a Good,
As noted in the introduction, since there is no way to 
erase the philosophical, cultural, and technological changes 
that eliminated the classical world-view, it would be 
unsatisfactory to replace our liberal world-view with it. 
Nevertheless, it is hoped that this attempt to understand 
one example of the classical world’s conception of persons 
can provide a philosophical opening in the liberal 
assumptions we make about ourselves and the world? an 
opening that might enable us both to experience and to speak
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meaningfully about our political interconnectedness and a 
richer understanding of our human faculties. The more 
ambitious task, however, will be to conceive of an ethical 
politics that aknowledges both liberalism's moral insight 
about the significance and dignity of persons and the 
classical world's insight about their political 
interconnectedness. To do so, will require us to conceive of 
and employ latent powers of human reason marked by a
contemplative rather than a manipulative character.
Since the primary purpose of this paper is 
foundational, it does not discuss how the moral insights of 
the classical world and liberalism could be integrated in a 
state. That task remains. A sketch of one possible synthesis 
of these two insights— what might be called an egalitarian 
perfectionism— can at least suggest the kind of integration 
that I envision.
An egalitarian perfectionist theory would take
seriously the perfection of each person in the state. Thus, 
the state, i.e. all of its citizens, would take an active 
role in discerning and nurturing the activities appropriate 
to the capacities of each person and to the state. As a
result, a mutual concern for the perfection of each other
would be facilitated through the structure and functions of 
political and social institutions. The primary structure 
would be one that encourages and enables political and 
ethical discourse that is both critical and visionary.
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Although great deference in this public discourse would 
be given to those persons who have demonstrated their 
wisdom, both the classical and liberal belief in the ethical 
and political capabilities of each person and the liberal 
scepticism about the ability to attain certain knowledge 
would advise against absolutely entrusting the direction of 
the state to guardians or technocrats. These considerations 
would also warrant a public/ private distinction. Onlike a 
liberal distinction, however, the state or our public lives 
would not be treated merely as the means for achieving 
private goals. Rather, this distinction would be between 
those fundamental activities of the state on which a 
consensus had been obtained and proposed activities that 
lacked a consensus. The ultimate goal, of course, would be 
to achieve a consensus about as many activities as possible. 
But, in keeping with the critical nature of this public 
discourse, even activities about which a consensus had been 
reached would be subject to continued examination.
There would be two different levels to the private 
domain. The first level would be permanent, it would entail 
a sphere of action where the state would not interfere with 
a person's actions. Such a sphere would be necessary to 
express the insight of liberalism about the significance of 
individual persons. The second level of the private domain 
would be provisional. It would entail a sphere of action 
that could in the future be integrated into the public
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domain as consensus is achieved about the state's role in 
such matters. Because of this private domain, there would 
have to be liberal principles of justice, like Rawls', to 
ensure that the significance of individual persons is in 
fact respected.
Thus, such principles of justice would play an 
important role in the state. Their justification, however, 
would be qualified by the recognition of the inadequacies of 
the liberal conception of the relationship between persons 
and of persons' faculties. Thus, the just society that 
Rawls' envisions would be considered a necessary but 
insufficient condition for a richer social life that has 
integrated into itself the moral insights of the classical 
world-view.
Of course, an egalitarian perfectionism faces a host of 
questions that demonstrate problems in synthesizing these 
two world-views. If the citizenry has the conviction that 
there is a Good but possesses a dose of scepticism about a 
person's ability to know it, how could the state, short of a 
consensus, justify the use of coercion in taking a public 
action toward that end? Given our pluralism, is it likely 
that a consensus could ever be obtained about public matters 
of any significance? If so, how would a consensus be 
obtained? How would people be persuaded to support these 
public ends? How would we ensure that a small minority of 
dissenters are not too hastily deemed irrational, i.e..
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unable to comprehend the public good? Etc.
All of these questions arise from the epistemology of 
the liberal world-view, which is radically sceptical about 
the possibility of evaluative moral knowledge. Further, it 
is difficult to imagine how this scepticism can be shaken. 
It does seem inevitable, however, that our world-view, like 
prior ones, will change. To be sure, the change will occur 
very slowly. It cannot occur by fiat or by a sheer act of 
will to adopt a new philosophical theory. It will grow 
almost imperceptibly out of careful attention to those 
experiences and sets of experiences— physical, emotional, 
intellectual, and spiritual— to which liberalism's
conception of persons and the world fails to do justice.
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